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CONTRIBUTORS

January 1975 marks the beginning of NMHR's fiftieth year of publication. To celebrate our survival into middle age, we persuaded a representative
group of our outstanding contributors over the years to write for a special
Borderlands issue.
Although the later work of FRANCE V. SCHOLES, "dean of the investigators" in the archives of Mexico and Spain, has won him worldwide reputation as an outstanding authority on the colonial history of Central America
and New Spain, he was one of the pioneer documentary historians of
seventeenth-century New Mexico. The results of his research, published in
NMHR beginning in 1928, disclose an unsurpassed panorama of the early
history of New Mexico.
During the decade 1941-1951 DONALD E. WORCESTER published in
NMHR articles on the Apache, the Navajo, Spanish horses in the Southwest,
and Indian weapons. Like Dr. Scholes, he moved on from Borderlands
history into wider fields and is the author of a number of basic texts on
Latin America. He is now at work on a history of the Western Apaches.
RICHARD E. GREENLEAF'S first article in NMHR concerned the founding
of Albuquerque and appeared in 1964. Like Scholes and Worcester, his
research and writings are not confined to regional topics. His particular
specialties are ecclesiastical and legal history, and he has published studies
in depth of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Mexico.
Assistant Editor of NMHR from 1970 to 1972, JOHN L. KESSELL made
his debut in its pages in 1966. His scholarly investigations and publications
range from Sonora and Arizona to New Mexico.
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ROYAL TREASURY RECORDS
RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF
NEW MEXICO, 1596-1683

FRANCE V. SCHOLES

THE Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla contains more than
thirty-eight thousand legajos (bundles) of manuscript and printed
documents relating to the colonial history of Spanish America and
the Philippine Islands. This vast accumulation of research materials,
ranging in date from the time of Columbus to the nineteenth century, is organized in sixteen Secciones (divisions) of varying extent
and topical content. Seccion II, entitled Contaduria General del
Consejo de Indias and comprising 1,963 legajos, contaJns fiscal
records of the central agencies of colonial government and administnition in Spain-Consejo de Indias and Casa de la Contrataci6nand a long series (legajos 657-1963) of financial reports from the
several branches of the royal treasury in the Indies-Cajas Reales de
Indias. 1
It was customary for the principal officers of the colonial Cajas
Reales (specifically designated as the op,ciales reales) to send to the
Council of the Indies periodic ledger accounts (cuentas) of royal
income and expenditures for their respective jurisdictional districts.
Detailed entries in these accounts were arranged, as we might expect, under two headings: I) Cargo, or items of Crown revenue
for which the oficiales reales were responsible, and 2) Data, properly authorized expenditures.
Some of the important categories of Crown income in Spanish
America may be listed as follows: I) the royal share of gold and
silver production; 2) import and export duties (almojarifazgos);
3) sales taxes (alcabalas); 4) tribute paid by the Indians of Crown
towns, i.e., towns not granted in encomienda to colonists and/ot
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their descendants; 5) royal monopolies such as quicksilver, playing
cards, stamped paper, salt, tobacco, etc.; 6) taxes on the salaries or
emoluments of civil, military, and ecclesiastical officials (media
anata); 7) sales of public office; 8) the royal share of ecclesiastical
tithes (the dos novenas); 9) the sale of ecclesiastical indulgences
(cruzada).2 The relative importance, in terms of actual receipts, of
any single source of income varied greatly, of course, from one
treasury district to another, depending upon geographical location,
natural resources, population, regional economic conditions, and
historical circumstances.
Major categories of disbursements of royal revenues recorded in
the colonial treasury accounts included: I) salaries and other
emoluments of government officials; 2) stipends of officers and enlisted military personnel; 3) costs of construction and maintenance
of public buildings and military and naval installations; 4) the
Crown's share of building costs of cathedral churches; 5) pensions
and grants-in-aid (ayudas de costa) to retired servants of the Crown,
and to many conquistadores, first settlers, and their descendants; 6)
grants of royal funds for a term of years, frequently renewed, to
cathedral and parish churches for purchase of ecclesiastical ornaments and vestments, sacramental wine, and oil; 7) generous and
continuing support of missions and missionary personnel, especially
in newly evangelized and frontier provinces. The volume of outgo
for any single category of expense varied, as in the case of income,
from region to region.
For historians of Spanish America the periodic ledger accounts of
the colonial treasury offices constitute an invaluable source of detailed information for specialized research monographs and more
generalized writings on administrative, religious, economic, and regional aspects of imperial enterprise in the New World. During the
past half-eentury these records have been utilized by authors of
basic studies on the volume of gold and silver production in Spanish
America and its impact on the economy of Spain and Europe. s
Accounts of tribute revenues have provided significant data for estimates of Indian population in colonial times. 4 The treasury records
for Peru in the eighteenth century have been systematically ana-
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lyzed by John T ePaske as a primary source for his forthcoming study
of the efficacy of Bourbon reforms in South America. The recently
published Bolton Prize essay by Peter Bakewell, Silver Mining and
Society in Colonial Mexico, Zacatecas 1546-1 700,fS demonstrates
the research potential of the ledger accounts for works on regional
history.
The present essay, based on the colonial treasury records in Sevilla, begins with the first royal expenditures for Juan de Onate's
expedition to found and colonize New Mexico (1596) and ends
with the expiration of Governor Antonio de Oterm:in's term of office
(1683), during which the Pueblo Revolt and the first, but unsuccessful, attempt at reconquest occurred. For these years the ledger
accounts of the royal treasury offices of Mexico City, Zacatecas, and
Durango contain several hundred entries relating to New Mexican
affairs. 6
In 1924 the legajos containing these accounts were damaged by a
fire in the Archive of the Indies in Sevilla. The edges of the pages are
badly charred, and many are water stained, which makes it difficult
to read or obtain satisfactory photographic reproductions of the
handwritten texts and monetary tabulations. Moreover, it is evident
that some accounts are now missing. The patient and painstaking
task of searching out and listing the New Mexico entries from the
1590's to 1700 scattered through these damaged records was undertaken in 1928-1929 by Lansing B. Bloom, founder and first editor of
the New Mexico Historical Review. During my residence in Sevilla
in 1932-1934, I was able to add many items to Bloom's list, especially
in the cargo, or receipts, divisions of the accounts.'1
Ninety per cent of the New Mexico entries in the royal treasury
accounts from 1596 to 1683 are classified as data, or expenditures.
This is not surprising. In 1608-1609, Viceroy Luis de Velasco II
and his advisers, following receipt of Onate's resignation as provincial governor, decided to assume, in the name of the Crown, responsibility for maintenance of the New Mexico colony and evangelization of the Indian population, although they knew from reliable
reports that the area lacked rich mineral and agricultural resources
and that royal revenues were likely to be negligible.
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The expenditures will be described and summarized under the
following general headings: I) colonization costs; 2) salaries and
travel allowances of provincial governors; 3) support of the missionary program; 4) military expenses; 5) emergency aid for the colony;
6) miscellaneous costs. These categories are not mutually exclusive
but have been adopted as the basis for analysis of more than five
hundred recorded items. The cargo, or revenue, entries, will be
brieRy summarized later. s
The standard monetary unit employed in the seventeenth-eentury treasury accounts was the peso de oro comun, valued at 272
Spanish maravedis. It was commonly known as the silver peso of
eight tomines, or reales. The tomIn, or real, comprised twelve
granos. 9 Ledger entries recorded exact amounts in full-pesos,
tomines, granos. The totals shown below have been rounded out to
pesos, but the calculations have taken into account the tomIn and
grano parts of component items.

EXPENDITURES

I) Colonization Costs
This includes outlays by the royal treasury in connection with
Onate's colonizing expeditions of 1596-1598, the reinforcements
sent in 1599-1600, and aid to the colony in 1608-1609 and on a few
later occasions.
Most of the major expeditions of discovery and colonization in
sixteenth-century Spanish America took the form of entrepreneurial
enterprise, for which the leader and his principal associates contracted to provide most of the financial investment. Aid from the
Crown and its agencies of colonial government was usually limited
to special grants-in-aid, or for specified military and missionary programs, and so it was in the case of Onate's contract for the colonization of New Mexico. This was authorized in 1595 by Viceroy Luis
de Velasco and modified in some of its terms by Velasco's successor,
the Conde de Monterrey. By this agreement Onate was granted a
loan of six thousand pesos to facilitate organization of the 1596-1598
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expedition; this was later repaid in full. He also received four
thousand pesos as a free grant not specified in the contract, "to aid
him and his people who are going to New Mexico for the arrest,
which by special commission he has been ordered to effect of Captain Francisco de Leiba Bonilla and his companions, who have entered New Mexico without order or permission."lo
Onate's agents were enlisting colonists in Mexico City early in
1596 while he was directing preparations for the expedition in Zacatecas. In June these recruits were conducted to Zacatecas under the
direction of persons whose salaries were paid by the royal treasury
at a cost of 768 pesos. When the viceroy received reports that en
route to Zacatecas Onate's colonists had comitted grave offenses
against Indians and other persons, he sent one of the alcaldes del
crimen (judges for criminal cases of the Audiencia of Mexico),
accompanied by bailiffs, to punish those he might find guilty. This
inquiry cost the treasury 827 pesos. The greatest expenditures in
1596-1598 were for the two inspections of Onate's forces and equipment by viceregal agents and their assistants. The first, directed by
Lope de Ulloa y Lemos, cost 4,865 pesos; the second, conducted by
Juan de Frias Salazar, cost 3,465 pesos. Finally, the costs of inspecting the reinforcement expedition of 1599-1600 by Juan de Sotelo
Cisneros amounted to 3,162 pesos. l l
Thus we find that the recorded royal expenditures (not including,
of course, costs incurred for equipment and transportation of Franciscan missionaries) for the two colonizing expeditions of 15961598 and 1599-1600 totaled 17,087 pesos.
In the autumn of 1601 many of the colonists and most of the
Franciscan missionaries withdrew from New Mexico to settlements
in Nueva Vizcaya. This action had been prompted by disagreement
with some of Onate's governmental policies, as well as by the realization that New Mexico did not offer the rich rewards expected.
Onate's agents in Mexico City petitioned the viceroy to force the
deserters to return to New Mexico, and to authorize enlistment of a
large new contingent of soldier-colonists at treasury expense. The
viceroy and his advisers now called for formal investigation of complaints filed by the deserters and reappraisal of conditions in New
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Mexico and the prospects for the future of the colony. Meanwhile,
as an emergency measure, on February 29, 160 I, the viceroy authorized a loan of four thousand pesos from the treasury office in Mexico
City to Cristobal de Onate, brother and bondsman (fiador) of Juan
de Onate, to assist colonists who might be disposed to return. The
loan was repaid in installments during the years 1602-1605.12
In an investigation of conditions in New Mexico many persons
testified on the basis of personal knowledge. It provided convincing
evidence that the resources of the area had been exaggerated and
that maintenance of the colony would require large and continuing
support from the treasury. Although the viceregal authorities were
not ready to make a firm commitment at that time (1602-1603),
they did send four Franciscan friars with military escort to New
Mexico in 1603, and two friars with escort in 1605, at the expense
of the treasury. For several years, from 1602 to 1608-1609, the
future of the New Mexico colony hung in the balance while the
whole enterprise, even the possibility of abandoning it completely,
was the subject of continuing debate in viceregal circles and in the
Council of the Indies. 1s
The issues had not been resolved when, in December 1607, Fray
Lazaro Ximenez, one of the Franciscan missionaries who had been
serving in New Mexico, arrived in Mexico City, representing the
colonists and friars of New Mexico. Viceroy Velasco had recently
returned for a second term of office after serving in Peru. The friar
bore a message of great import. In a letter to the viceroy, dated
August 24, 1607, Onate announced his resignation as governor of
New Mexico. He reported serious discontent among his soldiercolonists because his pleas for substantial aid from the viceregal
government had not been granted. He would have no alternative but
to give them permission to leave New Mexico at the end of June
1608 unless adequate support of the colony was ensured. A letter of
the same date from the cabildo of the Villa de San Gabriel confirmed
his statements. 14 These messages spurred Velasco and his aides to
action.
Early in February 1608 soldiers were enlisted to escort Father
Ximenez, who would now return to New Mexico with messages and
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orders. 15 On February 27, I 608, Velasco issued decrees as follows:
I) Onate's resignation was accepted, but he was ordered not to
leave New Mexico until he received further instructions. 2) Captain
Juan Martinez de Montoya, then resident in New Mexico, was
named provincial governor to serve at the discretion of the viceroy.
3) The colonists were ordered to stay in New Mexico pending a
final decision by the viceroy and the Crown with regard to the future
status of the province. 16 Father Ximenez probably left Mexico City
with the viceregal dispatches in March 1608, in time to reach New
Mexico and return to the capital early in December 1608. 17
In March 1608 Velasco authorized other measures to help New
Mexico and mitigate the discontent prevalent there. A contingent of
soldiers was enlisted for service in New Mexico and to escort a
supply caravan to be sent out at treasury expense. When the caravan
assembled in the Zacatecas area, it included five hundred head of
livestock (horses, cattle, sheep) and wagons for transport of clothing
and other supplies. The recorded costs, which I suspect are incomplete, amount to 3,270 pesos. 1S
When he arrived in Mexico City again in December, Fray Lazaro
Ximenez was accompanied by another Franciscan missionary and
two representatives of the Hispanic colony. They informed the viceroy that the cabildo of San Gabriel had refused to accept the appointment of MartInez de Montoya to replace Juan de Onate.
When Onate rejected their appeal. to him to continue as governor,
on the ground that his resignation had been formally accepted, the
cabildo had named his young son Cristobal de Onate governor. (We
may assume, of course, that the father continued to exercise effective
authority.) The Hispanic settlements now comprised only sixty
heads of families, of whom no more than thirty were capable of
bearing anns. But Father Ximenez did bring more encouraging
news. During the years 1607-1608 the Franciscans had converted
and baptized several thousand Pueblo Indians and continuing success of the missionary effort could be anticipated. This optimistic
report is suspect, for the available documentary data indicates that
only five or six friars were serving in New Mexico at this time.
Nevertheless it brought into focus one of the primary motives of
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Spanish imperial enterprise-the religious motive. After consultation with the Audiencia of Mexico, on January 29, 1609, Velasco
promulgated a decree that the province of New Mexico should be
maintained at royal expense. On the same date he ordered the recall
of Onate and his son to Mexico City.
To give positive effect to this landmark decision in the history of
New Mexico, during March and April 1609 Velasco took action as
follows: I) A new provincial governor, Pedro de Peralta, was appointed, at an annual salary of two thousand pesos. 2) Provision
was made to send nine more Franciscan missionaries to New Mexico, amply supplied for service there. 3) To reinforce the Hispanic
colony, the viceroy authorized enlistment of twelve or more soldiercolonists from New Spain. 4) Large quantities of supplies urgently
needed by the colony-building tools, nails, farm implements,
clothing, flour, two hundred oxen, etc.-were sent out with the new
governor and soldier-colonists. The total cost, paid by the treasury
offices of Mexico City and Zacatecas, was 13,572 pesos.t9 Peralta
and the supply train arrived in New Mexico sometime during the
first weeks of 1610. After the new governor had taken office, Onate,
by order of the viceroy, turned over to him one thousand head of
sheep and goats as further aid to the colonists. He was paid 1,375
pesos for these after he returned to Mexico City in 1611.20 Onate
also left Peralta a quantity of military supplies, which will be noted
under a separate heading.
Viceroy Velasco had finally assured that the New Mexico enterprise would not be abandoned. During succeeding decades the royal
treasury continued to make substantial outlays in the form of salaries
and stipends of provincial governors and military personnel and for
support of the missionary program. The colonization costs recorded
in the treasury accounts for this period are modest. For the years
1628-1631 we find entries totaling 1,760 pesos for purchase offarm
implements and subsidies of two hundred pesos each to three new
settlers going to New Mexico. In 1659 there is an item of four hundred pesos for two settlers. 21 A few families also went out at their
own expense. And some soldiers enlisted with pay for service in the
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military escorts for governors and friars going to New Mexico
remained as permanent settlers.
Summing up the royal expenditures for colonization listed above,
we arriveata total of 38,064 pesos.
2) Salaries and Travel Allowances of Provincial Governors (1609-

168 3)
Onate's contract for the colonization of New Mexico provided
that as governor and captain general he would receive an annual
salary of 6,000 ducados (equal to 8,272lh pesos de oro comun) to
be paid from the royal revenues of the province. 22 This was a very
substantial emolument as compared with the salaries of other
colonial officials at that time, but it was justified on the ground that
Onate would bear the major part of the costs ohhe expedition. But
neither Juan de Onate nor his son Cristobal received payment for
their governmental services because the province had not produced
any royal revenues.
In a letter to the king, dated February 13, 1609,23 Viceroy Velasco reported that the cabildo of San Gabriel had rejected the appointment of Martinez de Montoya and continued as follows: "I
am diligently seeking for a capable person, but since we cannot find
a wealthy man on whom we can depend, it will be necessary to provide the new governor with a salary from royal treasury which will
be as moderate as poSSible." On March 30, 16°9, Velasco named
Pedro de Peralta to serve as governor and captain general of New
Mexico with an annual salary of 2,000 pesos,24 a stipend that remained the same for Peralta's successors during the seventeenth
century. This was a modest amount, to be sure, compared with the
salary Onate was promised, but none of the governors who followed
Onate invested their personal fortunes in the New Mexico venture
as he had done. There is evidence that other provincial officials in
northern New Spain also received salaries of 2,000 pesos. In any
case, the contemporary documentary records indicate that in the
seventeenth century the office of governor of New Mexico was
actually sought by candidates who had had previous experience,
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usually military, in colonial affairs. Many seventeenth-century
governors used their terms of office for personal profit over and above
their salaries.
Viceroy Velasco did not specify the duration of Peralta's term
but merely stated that he would serve at the discretion of the viceroy.
This discretionary provision reappears in the appointments of other
governors, but by the 1640'S appointments were made for a threeyear term, still subject to the discretionary provision.
The total earned salary of each governor, based on 2,000 pesos
per annum, was calculated on a period of time beginning with the
date of his departure from Mexico City to the date on which his
successor made formal presentation of his viceregal appointment in
Santa Fe. Thus each governor earned salary for the time spent en
route to New Mexico, but not for the return trip after he left office.
The time spent on the outgoing journey varied considerably, de~
pending on circumstances. Many governors traveled with the mission supply caravans, which normally took four to six months.
In 1609 Viceroy Velasco authorized payment of a year's salary
to Governor Peralta before he started for New Mexico; and this
precedent was followed up until 1652, when Juan Samaniego y
Xaca was granted a two-year advance (4,000 pesos). The next two
appointees, Juan Manso de Contreras and Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal received the same. In 166 I the advance payment was increased to 6,000 pesos, for three years, when Diego de Pefialosa was
appointed; and his successor, Juan Duran de Miranda, also received
a three-year advance. In 1665, when Fernando de Villanueva became governor, the advance payment was cut back to 2,000 pesos. 25
Before receiving any advance payment, the new appointee was
required to file a bond (~anza) with the Mexico City treasury office
to guarantee refund of any unearned salary. He also obligated himself to render appropriate accounting for any royal revenues that
might accrue during his term of office in New Mexico; and to satisfy
any claims or charges against him that might result from his residencia. 26 After the media anata tax was levied on colonial salaries in
the 1620'S, the new appointee was also required to pay the initial
installment of this or to post bond for such payments. During a
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governor's term of service in New Mexico additional salary payments were often made to his authorized agent in Mexico City. Final
payment for any remaining balance was made only after he had
returned to Mexico City and satisfactorily liquidated any claims or
charges related to his term of office, including formal adjudication
by the viceroy and audiencia of his residencia. Consequently final
salary payments were often delayed for a year or more after a governor had concluded active service in New Mexico.
During the years 16°9-1683, twenty-three viceregal appointments of governors of New Mexico were made, including both of
Dudm y Miranda's terms. The governors are listed in the Appendix,
with the amount of salary (actual or estimated) earned by each one.
The total sum for this seventy-four-year period amounts to 171,337
pesos, of which somewhat more than 20,000 pesos were paid for the
time spent on the outgoing journey to New Mexico.
In addition to their salaries most governors received some form of
aid or emolument for the expenses of the outgoing journey to New
Mexico. In 1609 the Viceroy authorized payment of a cash grant-inaid (ayuda de costa) of 500 pesos to Pedro de Peralta for supplies,
equipment, and transport animals needed for the long trip north. A
similar cash grant, plus 830 pesos for a wagon and mules, was made
to Bernardino de Ceballos in 1613. Although Juan de Eulate received five hundred pesos in 1618, he was obliged to refund it
later. 27 The ledger accounts do not record travel allowances for
Governors Sotelo Osorio and Silva Nieto.
Beginning with the year 1631, for each newly appointed governor the royal treasury paid the costs of two wagons, with mules and
necessary equipment. In the 1670's this was reduced to one wagon,
mules, and equipment for Governors Dunin de Miranda (second
term), Trevino, and Otermln. 28
The'" total cost of travel allowances 16°9-1683 amounted
to 37,441 pesos, which, added to salaries, makes the total outlay for
provincial governors 204,778 pesos. The treasury did recover a
small part of this in the· form of the media anata tax.

16
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3) Support of the Missionary Program

In accordance with customary policy the viceregal government of
New Spain pledged royal treasury aid for a band of missionaries to
accompany Onate's colonizing expedition and to initiate the evangelization of New Mexico's native population. For this group of nine
Franciscan friars the treasury offices of Mexico City and Zacatecas
expended 24,255 pesos for clothing, vestments, ecclesiastical ornaments, food, and costs of transportation to New Mexico. Nine more
friars were sent out with the reinforcement expedition of 1599-1600,
for whom the treasury offices incurred an additional cost of 26,508
pesos. 29 These Franciscan pioneers established mission churches
and friaries in some of the northern and central Pueblo villages.
Some of these first missionaries had returned to New Spain or died
prior to the autumn of 1601, when many of the colonists left the
province. This dissident group was accompanied by most of the
resident friars. The contemporary records indicate that only three
Franciscans, two priests and a lay brother, remained in New Mexico
at the end of 1601. 30
•
During succeeding years (1602-1608) when the future status of
the New Mexico colony was the subject of continuing debate in
viceregal circles, only six more missionaries were dispatched to New
Mexico, four in 1603 and two in 16°5, at a total cost to the treasury
of 10,961 pesos. 3 ! But despite the small number of friars on active
service, it appears that steady progress was made in the missionary
enterprise and this was the major factor leading to Viceroy Velasco's
decision to maintain and reinforce the colony at Crown expense.
By this decision the Viceroy pledged, in effect, substantial and
continuing expenditures by the royal treasury in support of the missionary program. For the twenty years from 1609 to 1629 we have
records of treasury subsidies for six new contingents of Franciscan
friars dispatched to New Mexico and for assistance to those already
serving there. The net cost of these subsidies amounted to 222,776
pesos. 32
The generous backing of the missionary program enabled the
Franciscans rapidly to expand the area of evangelization among the
Pueblo villages. This is the period of New Mexico mission history
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customarily associated with the names of two well-known Franciscan prelates, or custodes, Fray Esteban de Perea and Fray Alonso de
Benavides. Both wrote valuable accounts of local developments during these formative years. From these writings we learn that by 1630
mission churches and residences for the friars had been founded in
most of the important Pueblo centers. 33 The ledger entries recording
expenditures for the New Mexico missions during 1609- I 629 often
contain descriptive information concerning the vestments, ecclesiastical ornaments, paintings and sculptured images (santos), missals
and breviaries, bells of different sizes and weights, and building
materials (especially nails and other hardware items) purchased;
And the accounts frequently list names of the merchants or artisans
in Mexico City and Zacatecas who supplied these items and the
prices paid. 34
During these formative years the New Mexico mission caravans
were sent out from Mexico City at somewhat irregular intervals of
three to five years. The costs of supplies, church furnishings, and
transportation were increasing, and this caused some concern to the
authorities. In order to economize and to place the supply service on
a more orderly basis, the treasury officials and an authorized agent
of the Franciscan Province of the Holy Gospel, which exercised
supervisory jurisdiction over the New Mexico missions, entered into
a formal contractual agreeIl1ent in May 163 I. This contract comprised explicit terms and regulations for future control and administration of the New Mexico supply service. In an earlier publication
I have presented an English translation (which needs some revision!) of this contract and a summary of the later history of the
supply service prior to 1680. 35 For the purposes of this essay, only a
few points need be mentioned: I) The contract provided for a
triennial caravan service to New Mexico for transport of new friarrecruits to the missions and of supplies for them and the friars
already serving there. (The first triennium was to run from August
3, 1630, to August 2, 1633.) 2) The agreement stipulated the
amounts of the triennial subsidies for each Franciscan priest and lay
brother. 3) A maximum quota of sixty-six friars, including newcomers and those already in the province, was established. 4) One
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wagon with mules, equipment, etc. would be provided for every two
friars receiving triennial subsidies. 5) The royal treasury would pay
the costs of a military escort for the caravans.
The caravan service was administered by the procurador (agent)
of the Franciscan Province of the Holy Gospel until 1664, when the
Order relinquished control to a new contractor, Juan Manso de Contreras, an ex-governor of New Mexico. The viceregal government
terminated the new agreement in 1671. After this date the royal
treasury fixed an annual stipend for each Franciscan missionarypriest or lay brother-paid to the procurador of the Province of the
Holy Gospel, who would make the arrangements for transport of
recruits and supplies on whatever basis might be found most
suitable.
Treasury expenditures for the first triennial supply service (163°1633) based on a quota of sixty-six friars, amounted to 87,725 pesos.
During the succeeding half-century to 1683 the number of friars
subsidized was often less. For the 1657-1660 triennium, however,
the treasury allotted allowances for seventy friars, including four to
be assigned to recently established missions in the Paso del Norte
(modern Ciudad Juarez) district. After this, the quota again
dropped below sixty-six, but for the three triennia 1674-1677, 1677168o, and 1680-1683, there were full quotas again. The total net
expenditures for the support of the New Mexico missions for the
period 163°-1683 may be estimated at approximately 970,000
peSOS.36

To sum up, the total treasury expenditures for support of the missionary program in New Mexico from 1596 to 1683 amounted to at
least 1,254,500 pesos.
(to be concluded)
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APPENDIX

Salaries of Provincial Governors, 16°9-1683.
The treasury records contain complete and exact information concerning the total salary payments to many governors. In some cases,
however, the beginning or final dates for salary periods, and occasionally both, are missing because of the present condition of the
ledger accounts. In such cases I have arrived at approximate dates on
the basis of other contemporary documentary data.

Pesos
Pedro de Peralta
16.IV. 16°9-1 2.V. 1614
Bernardino de Ceballos
1.X.16 13-22.XII. 1618
Juan de Eulate
LIlI. 16 18-21 .XIl.1625
Felipe de Sotelo Osorio
22.V. 1625-LV.1629
Francisco Manuel de Silva Nieto
23.vIlI. I628-ca. LIII.1632
Francisco de la Mora Ceballos
LXI. 163 I-ca. LXII.1634
Francisco Martinez de Baeza
+VII. 1634-18.IV. 1637
Luis de Rosas
12.X. 1636-12.IV.1641
Juan Flores de Sierra y Valdes
ca. I.xI. 164°-ca. I.IX. 1642
Flores died in Santa Fe early in the autumn of
1641 (exact date not recorded). To estimate his
salary I have used September I. The cabildo of
Santa Fe exercised governmental powers until
Pacheco y Heredia took office in the spring of 1642
(exact date not recorded).

10,144
10,455
15,622
7,890
(est.) 7,046
(est.) 6,167
5,584
8,986
(est.) 1,667

20

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW L:l 1975

Alonso Pacheco y Heredia
30·XI. 1641-5,XII.I644
Fernando de Arguello Carvajal
10.1.1 644-4-V, 1647
Luis de Guzman y Figueroa
ca. LXI. 1646-ca. 1.IV. 1649
Hernando de Ugarte y la Concha
17.XI. 1648-22.v. 1653
Juan Samaniego y Xaca
16.XI. 1652-24.IV. 1656
Juan Manso de Contreras
29·XI. 1655-10.VII. 1659
Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal
ca. LXII. 1658-ca. 15.vIII. 166 1
Diego Dionisio de Pefialosa Bricefio y Berdugo
ca. l.II. 1661-ca. 1.II. 1664

6,033
6,636
(est.) 4,833
8,862
6,880
7,222
(est.) 5,414
(est.) 6,000

Pefialosa left for Mexico City without viceregal
permission early in 1664 (exact date not recorded).
He named Tome Dominguez de Mendoza to serve
as acting governor until the arrival of a new viceregal appointee. His successor was already on the
way to Santa Fe and took office in April 1664.

Juan Duran de Miranda
2.XII. 1663-2LVI. 1665

3,107

Duran de Miranda received an advance of 6,000
pesos. It appears that his term of office was cut
short because of complaints from New Mexico
about some of his policies, and the viceroy ap-pointed a new governor to replace him. Apparently Duran de Miranda cleared himself, for he
was later reappointed for a second term.

Francisco de Villanueva
1o.III. 1665-29.xI. 1668
Juan Rodriguez de Medrano y Mesia
2.IV. 1668-20.VII. 167 1
Juan Duran de Miranda (second term)
25.1.1671-1 o.IlI. 1675

7,448
6,603
8,246
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Juan Francisco Trevino
30.1. 16 74-29·XL 16 77
Antonio deOtermfn
29. 111. I 677-28.VIIL 1683

7,665

12,827
Total salaries

171,337

NOTES

. I. For a short historico-descriptive account of this archive and summary analyses of its several sections, see Jose Maria de la Pena y Camara,
Atchillo General de Indias: Gu£a delllisitante (Madrid, 1958). Titles and
date spans of legajos in the Contaduria series are listed in Pedro Torres
Lanzas, Catdlogo de legajos del Archillo General de Indias, Secciones primera y segunda: Patronato y Contadur£a General del Consejo de Indias
(Sevilla, 1919), pp. 35 et seq.
2. 1. Sanchez Belda, La organizaci6n financiera de las Indias. Siglo XVI
(Sevilla, 1968) is a good general survey of the colonial royal exchequer. C.
H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York, 1947), pp. 274-312,
provides an excellent brief review of major sources of royal revenues in
America. For a detailed account of the royal exchequer in New Spain, compiled in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, consult Fabian de
Fonseca and Carlos de Urrutia, Historia general de real hacienda, 6 vols.

(Mexico, 1845-53).

3. For example, see articles by C. H. Haring and Earl J. Hamilton in
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vols. 29 and 43 respectively; and Hamilton,
American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 15°1-165° (Cambridge, Mass., 1934).
4. Data derived, directly or indirectly, from the royal treasury records
have been utilized by Woodrow Borah and Sherburne F. Cook in their
several studies of the Indian population of colonial Mexico published by
the University of California Press.
5. Published by Cambridge University Press, 1971. Bakewell is preparing a similar study on the Potosi mining area in South America.
6. Archivo General de Indias, Secci6n de Contadurfa (AGI, Contad.),
legajos 695-776, 801 (Caja de Mexico), 842-850 (Caja de Zacatecas), 926
(Caja de Durango). Onate's contract for the founding of New Mexico
envisaged creation of a separate treasury office for the province of New

22

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW L:1 1975

Mexico. George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey, trans. and eds., Don Juan
de Onate, Colonizer of New Mexico, 1595-1628 (Albuquerque, 1953), p.
52. Such an office was not needed because of the lack of mineral resources
and the arid agricultural economy.
7. In 1938 Bloom made microfilm copies in Spain of the New Mexico
items he had listed a decade earlier. Record prints are available for scholarly
use in Special Collections, Zimmerman Library, The University of New
Mexico. I have handwritten transcriptions made from the original manuscripts by a veteran archive palaeographer.
8. Lansing B. Bloom, "Spain's Investment in New Mexico under the
Hapsburg's," The Americas, vol. I (1944-45), pp. 3-14 provides a good
account of the damage to the Contaduria legajos caused by the fire and
summary estimates of the major categories of royal expenditures from the
Onate period to 1697. George P. Hammond, "The Crown's Participation in
the Founding of New Mexico," NMHR, vol. 32 (1957), pp. 293-309,
describes royal expenditures as part of a general chronological narrative of
the Onate period.
9. The ledger entries sometimes record transactions in ducados (375
maravedis) and pesos de oro de minas (450 maravedis), but to maintain
uniformity in the accounts the totals were equated to pesos de oro comtin
on the basis of the values in maravedis. Occasionally we also find records
of transactions in marks (marcos) of silver bullion, which would also be
equated into silver peso values at current values of bullion.
10. Payment to Onate by order of Viceroy Conde de Monterrey, 19 Feb.
1596, AGI, Contad. 695. Onate's contract, as authorized by Velasco, provided for a free grant of specified quantities of arms, armor, and munitions
from the royal armory. Monterrey modified this provision to the effect that
Onate should pay for same. Onate's agent filed appeal to the Crown. Because of urgency in getting the expedition under way, Monterrey may have
authorized the 4000-peso grant in lieu of the contested provision in the
contract. It was not yet known in Mexico in 1596 that Leiba and Humana,
leaders of the unauthorized 1593 expedition, had been killed.
11. Expenditures noted above are itemized in AGI, Contad. 695A, 696,
699B, 701-04, 842A.
12. AGI, Contad. 703, 707. The formal payment, made in 1605, was
from the tributes of the town of Tecali, held in encomienda by Crist6bal
de Oiiate.
13. For extensive review of developments for the period 1601-1608/
1609, see George P. Hammond, Don Juan de Onate and the Founding of
New Mexico (Santa Fe, 1927), chapters 9-II; Hammond and Rey, pp. 672
et seq.
14. Ibid., pp. 1040-45.
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15. This contingent received an advance payment of a year's salary on
Feb. 1608. AGI, Contad. 710.
16. Hammond and Rey, pp. 1046-55.
17. Ximenez' return to Mexico City is noted in a letter of Velasco to
the King, 17 Dec. 1608. Ibid., pp. 1067-68.
18. AGI, Contad., 710, 850'
19. Hammond and Rey, pp. 1°75-92; AGI, Contad. 71 1,850.
20. Ibid., 713.
21. Ibid., 728, 729, 732, 751.
22. Hammond and Rey, p. 51.
23. Ibid., p. 1081.
24. Ibid., p. 1085.
25. Records of salary payments 1609 et seq. are scattered through AGI,
Contad.695-77°·
26. The official inquiry into his governmental actions conducted at the
end of his term of office by his successor.
27. AGI, Contad. 71 1,716,845.
28. The cost per wagon, with mules, equipment, etc., was calculated on
the same basis as for the mission supply service.
29. AGI, Contad. 695-7°5, 842.
30. France V. Scholes and Lansing B. Bloom, "Friar Personnel and
Mission Chronology, 1598-1629," NMHR, vol. 19 (1944), pp. 319-36, vol.
20 (1945), pp. 58-82, 19:320-23.
3 I. AGI, Contad. 703, 705, 707, 84 2 .
32. The gross treasury outlay for the New Mexico missions during this
period was 238,775 pesos, but this sum may be reduced by 15,999 pesos, the
proceeds from the sale at auction of some of the wagons and mules after the
supply caravans returned to Mexico City. AGI, Contad. 711-729, 845, 850'
33. For a summary of missionary developments 16°9-29, see Scholes
and Bloom.
34. For an English translation of the lists of supplies sent in 1625 and
1626, see Frederick W. Hodge, George P. Hammond, and Agapito Rey,
Fray Alonso de Benavides' Revised Memorial of 1634 (Albuquerque, 1945),
pp. 1 09-2 4·
35. France V. Scholes, "The Supply Service of the New Mexico Missions in the Seventeenth Century," NMHR, vol. 5 (1930), pp. 93-1 I 5,
186-210,3 86-4°4.
36. For two of the triennial caravans (1633-36 and 1636-39) the treasury
records lack complete accounts of expenditures for the missions. For these
years I have made minimum estimates on the basis of other documentary
evidence. New Mexico ledger entries for the years 163°-83 are in AGI,
Contad·73 1-768 .
I I
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THE APACHES IN THE HISTORY
OF THE SOUTHWEST

DONALD E. WORCESTER

THE APACHE INDIANS have played a unique role in the history
of North America despite the fact that they were always few in
number, lived widely scattered in small nomadic groups, and
rarely assembled in large numbers for any purpose. The Athapascans were apparently the last major wave into North America
before the Eskimos, for most of them are still in northwestern
Canada. Small bands of Athapascans, the forerunners of the
Apaches and Navajos, arrived in the Southwest perhaps a century
or two before the coming of the Spaniards. When Spaniards moving north from Mexico City reached the region of modem New
Mexico, they met Indians whose methods of waging war were unlike those of the sedentary peoples they had encountered earlier.
Spaniards were accustomed to people who lived in villages or cities,
who fought as armies, and who yielded when their leaders surrendered. They conquered the Aztecs, even though badly outnumbered, but they were totally unprepared for the guerrilla tactics of
the Apaches, and failed to conquer them in two centuries of warfare.
Apaches, like all Southern Athapascans, called themselves
"Dine," meaning "the people." "Apache," which may have been
a corruption of the Zuni word for "enemy," was a name the
Spaniards applied to them; like most American Indians the
Apaches became known to Europeans through neighboring tribes,
who had their own, usually unflattering, terms for them. The
Apaches were, except for the Lipans, Kiowa Apaches, and one
Jicarilla band, mountain people, although they were equally at
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home in the southwestern deserts. Unlike most Indians who occupied marginal lands, the Apaches were not too weak to force others
out of more desirable or fertile areas. They preferred their wild,
free, existence and their dependence on wild game and the roots
and seeds of·certain plants, as well as raids on sedentary peoples,
for their sustenance. Because of the constant need to search for
food, they were ever on the move.
Although living for warfare, the Apaches never attacked if the
outcome appeared uncertain. There were too few men to risk life
needlessly, and they had no esteem for dead heroes. They were
masters of stealth and surprise, and if they could not gain a decided advantage by these tactics they refrained from attacking.
The Spaniards brought new sources of food, and Apaches soon
developed a lingering taste for horse and mule meat, preferring
it to the flesh of cattle or sheep. Because they lived scattered
widely in groups of a few families, when they began raiding
Spanish herds the bands were always small.
Characteristic of the Apaches were certain traits mentioned by
many observers over the centuries-their hardiness and ability
to endure extremes of heat and cold and hunger, their scorn for
liars, the chastity of their women, their love of gambling, and their
sense of humor. Their physical fortitude and endurance were
legendary. Many writers have attested to their pride in truthfulness, and an equal number have commented, sometimes ruefully,
on the chastity of Apache women as exceptional. Parenthetically,
such chastity was greatly encouraged by the Apache practice of
cutting off the fleshy part of the nose of a woman caught in
. adultery. One example of their sense of humor was the name
they gave to bald-headed Agent John P. Clum: "Man-With-theHigh-Forehead."
The Apaches' gift for survival in a harsh environment was
also noted. They could nnd food and water where none could be
expected. And although they were always on the move, with smoke
signals by day and nres by night they could send and receive
messages over great distances in a remarkably short time, calling
others to council or warning of the approach of enemies. John C.
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Cremony, who became intimately acquainted with the Mescaleros, was astonished at their skill in concealing themselves in
open country covered only with gramma grass. 1
Beginning with Juan de Onate, the first Spanish governor of
New Mexico, who arrived with a colony shortly before 1600,
Spanish officials began seizing Apaches and selling them as slaves
in the mining camps to the south. This practice continued
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Mexicans maintained it through much of the nineteenth century. The
practice engendered bitter hatred for Spaniards, and as a result
of Apache hostility the Spanish northward advance was permanently checked at the Pueblo region of New Mexico and the
Pima and Sobafpuri villages of the Santa Cruz and San Pedro
valleys of southern Arizona. Not only was the advance checked
there, but Apache raids into Chihuahua and Sonora, from the
late seventeenth century on, pushed back the frontier and nearly
depopulated both provinces.
The Apaches were apparently the first of the wild Indians in the
present Southwest to acquire horses and to engage in mounted
combat. 2 Spaniards were authorized to employ Christianized
Pueblo Indians as herders. Some of these sought refuge with
Apaches in the 1630's and 1640'S, and no doubt taught them
to ride. Even after this the Apaches still ate most of the horses
and mules they stole from the Spaniards, keeping only a few of
the best for riding. They patterned their riding gear after that
of the Spaniards.a
There were a number of sporadic Pueblo Indian uprisings, but
it was only in 168o that a coordinated movement drove the Spaniards from the Rio Grande valley, a movement in which both
Apaches and Navajos took an active part. Only when they
learned that Apaches were actually helping the Pueblo rebels did
the Spaniards retreat. 4.
In the eighteenth century, because of their successful raids on
Spanish herds in Sonora and Chihuahua, in which they drove off
thousands upon thousands of horses, mules, and cattle, larger
numbers of Apaches were able to congregate and to participate in
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raids. Their tactics changed as a result, making their forays much
more terrifying and destructive than before. They no longer relied
on stealth, but in parties of several hundred boldly attacked
towns, ranches, and even presidios. They killed the men whenever possible, carrying off women and children either to be ransomed in New Mexico or adopted into the tribe. Many a Mexican
boy captured by Apaches grew up to become a feared warrior. In
this way the Apaches kept their numbers from declining drastically
despite constant punitive expeditions against them.
Faced with the probable loss of Sonora and Chihuahua, in 1776
the Spaniards created a new institution designed especially to cope
with the Apaches, something they had done for no other Indians.
This unique organization was the Commandancy General of the
Interior Provinces, meaning all of the northern frontier provinces.
It was a purely military jurisdiction, for the commander general's
duties were to wage constant warfare against the Apaches along
the whole frontier, a task that left him little time for civil administration. Another innovation was the campania volante or "Bying
company," a highly mobile cavalry force organized to pursue and
punish Apache raiders swiftly and effectively.
With an increased number of troops and improved firearms,
the commander general launched a determined war of extermination, using the Apaches of one band to help locate and surprise
the camps of other bands. In 1786, too, Viceroy Bernardo de
Galvez, who had served with the army in Apacheria, issued a
set of instructions to the commander general in which he introduced a new and more hopeful policy for controlling the Apaches
by tempering the extermination policy with opportunities for
making peace. Previously Spanish officials were not allowed to
make peace treaties with Apaches; now the Indians were to be
admitted to peace whenever they requested it, providing they
would locate their camps at establecimientos de paz (peace establishments) in the vicinity of one of the presidiOS. The extermination campaigns, coupled with the opportunity to live in peace
and be supplied provisions by the Spanish government, induced
many hard-pressed bands to accept peace terms. Galvez ordered
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that the Apaches be given not only food but aguardiente and even
Spanish fireanns, to make them dependent on Spanish friendship. He hoped they would give up altogether the use of the bow
and arrow. This was another new concept, for previously it had
been illegal to trade guns to Indians. 5
The new policy of intensified warfare using Apaches as scouts,
together with offers of protection and support at establecimientos
de paz, soon bore fruit, as the Chiricahuas and other bands voluntarily settled in camps near the Sonora and Chihuahua presidios.
As a result, there was a period of relative peace from about 1790
to 1830, during which time mining and ranching operations
spread along the northern frontier and into southern Arizona. It
was, for Sonora, a prosperous era, and it appeared that the
Apache problem was well on the way to solution. Even though
some recalcitrant bands still remained hostile, their own people
in the peace camps were willing to wage war against them.
After Mexican independence, however, the new nation entered
a time of troubles; supplies for the Apaches became irregular, and
military effectiveness declined noticeably. In the 1830'S the
Apaches returned to their old ways, and their raids became more
destructive than ever, reaching their peak in the 1840'S.
The dread of Apache raiders became so great in Chihuahua that
the desperate officials of that state made treaties with the Gilefio
Apache bands, treaties that excluded Sonora. Chihuahua offered
to provide food and protection for those Apaches who would return to the peace camps near the Janos presidio. The Apaches
were even allowed to sell or trade livestock stolen elsewhere. This
proved to be an attractive arrangement to some of the Gila bands,
for they had a refuge and food supply at Janos as well as opportunities for disposing of stolen animals. But after these Apaches
made several costly raids into Sonora, the Sonorans raised a force
and surprised the camps at Janos, killing many and carrying off
even more to be sold into slavery. Chihuahua officials were
furious, but the government supported Sonora.
In 1835 Sonora introduced a new and drastic method of combating Apaches, the scalp bounty system. At first bounties were
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paid only for the scalps of men, but soon payments were made
for the scalps of women and children as well, and for captives,
who were sold into slavery. Many Anglo-Americans entered the
lucrative "hair business," among them James Johnson, who lured
chief Juan Jose Compa and his Mimbrefio band to a feast, then
fired a concealed cannon into their midst. Another famous scalp
hunter was James ("Don Santiago") Kirker, the self-styled "King
of New Mexico." Scalp hunters killed or captured many Apache
women and children as well as some men, weakening especially
the Gila bands, the Mimbrefios, and the Mogollones. Bounty hunters presented hundreds of scalps for payment, but it was suspected
throughout the border that many "Apache" scalps for which they
were paid had once adorned the heads of luckless Mexican peons
or peaceful Indians. Long black hair was an invitation to disaster.
The war with Mexico brought Anglo-Americans to New
Mexico in 1846, and United States troops at first found themselves even less able to cope with Apaches than the Spaniards had
been. In the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the United
States promised to prevent Indians from crossing the border into
Mexico on raids, a promise that could not be kept without a
much more strenuous effort than the government was willing to
make. In the Gadsden Purchase of 1853 the United States took
advantage of Mexico's weakness by abrogating this agreement,
leaving the citizens of Sonora and Chihuahua as exposed as ever
to Apache depredations. A number of Apache bands lived permanently or part of each year in Mexico.
In the 1850'S troops guided by Kit Carson defeated and scattered the Jicarillas of northern New Mexico, who had less than
two hundred warriors, and other forces defeated the Mescaleros
of central and southeastern New Mexico. Both groups agreed to
keep the peace, but since the government supplied them with
only partial rations, they faced a choice between starvation and
thefts of livestock. Some of the Mimbrefios also settled down on
tributaries of the upper Gila to plant crops under the guidance of
an Indian agent, who soon considered them well on the way to
becoming self-supporting. But in 1857 Colonel Bonneville's
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Gila expedition against the Mogollones frightened them off, and
most Hed to Mexico.
The "Western Apaches," Coyoteros, T ontos, Pinalefios, and
Chiricahuas of Arizona, were willing to keep peace north of the
border if Anglos did not interfere with their time-honored raids
into Sonora and Chihuahua. Anglos had also fought the Mexicans, and they always seemed eager to trade for the cattle and
mules Apache raiders brought from Mexico, but American officials insisted that the raids must cease. To Apaches this attitude
was both arrogant and incomprehensible.
It has been traditional to blame the so-called Bascom affair at
Apache Pass in February 1861 for the intense Apache warfare
that broke out soon after. Actually, the breaking of a local treaty
in the Tubac area a few years earlier had already angered the
Apaches. The hanging of the hostages at Apache Pass, incorrectly
attributed to Lieutenant Bascom, was in retaliation for Cochise's
killing of Anglo captives; it certainly added fuel to the Hames,
but did not ignite them. The most important factor in stimulating
the sharp increase in Apache depredations north of the border
was the withdrawal of Union troops from the forts of southern
Arizona and of New Mexico in the summer of 1861 when a Confederate invasion of New Mexico was imminent. Convinced that
they had driven the troops away, the Chiricahuas, Gila Apaches,
and Mescaleros launched all-out campaigns to rid their lands of
Anglo intruders.
In 1862 Major James H. Carleton reached New Mexico with
the California Volunteers, but the Confederates had already withdrawn. Carleton, who was promoted and named military commander of the District of New Mexico, decided to keep his troops
occupied by relentless campaigns against Apaches and Navajos.
He had absolutely no mercy for Apaches-his oft-repeated instructions to his troops were to kill all the men. There were no
parleys with them; if they wanted to talk peace, their chiefs and
headmen must corne to Santa Fe to confer with Carleton in
person. But when the prominent Mescalero chief Manuelito and
his band were en route to Santa Fe in compliance with Carleton's
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inflexible demands, they met some of his troops. Manuelito and
others tried to explain their purpose, but were shot down without
warning.
As a result of Carleton's harsh policies, the destitute and virtually decimated Mescaleros surrendered and were confined on a
reservation at the desolate Bosque Redondo along the Pecos
River. Carleton had promised to return them to their own lands,
but decided instead to make them "happy" at the Bosque. It was
difficult for sick and starving Mescaleros to exhibit the happiness
Carleton demanded; his only words of consolation were that they
should be "too proud" to murmur at what could not be helped.
To make a bad situation impossible, he sent Kit Carson with a
large force to round up more than eight thousand Navajos and
add them to the Bosque Redondo reservation. The Mescaleros,
numbering less than five hundred, placed thus at the mercy of
their enemies, relished their happiness as long as they could stand
it, then fled. For several years they roamed their customary ranges,
causing no serious trouble other than occasional thefts of livestock.
In Arizona, early in 1871, some Arivaipa Apaches under chief
Eskiminzin came to Camp Grant to surrender, although the army
had no instructions for dealing with Apaches except as enemies.
Lieutenant Royal Whitman, commander at Camp Grant, welcomed them, nevertheless, and wrote a hasty request for instructions to his superiors, pointing out that it appeared possible that
many Apaches were ready to surrender. In his haste Whitman
neglected to brief the letter on the outside of the envelope as required by army regulations; some months later his letter was returned to him unread, with a terse notation calling attention to his
dereliction of duty in failing to brief it. Eventually, however, the
Apaches were allowed to remain at Camp Grant and receive food
from army stores. This was the first step away from the extermination policy in Arizona, a step the Apaches themselves initiated.
It was, however, a step that the people of Tucson resented. Their
anger increased when Whitman employed the Apaches in gathering hay and firewood for the military post, for this took money out
of the hands of contractors.
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Raids attributed to Apaches continued occasionally in southern
Arizona, and some Tucson men, together with a large number of
Papagos, slipped up on the Camp Grant Apaches and killed an
estimated eighty or more. All but eight of the slain were women
and children, and twenty-eight children were carried off to be
sold into slavery in Sonora. This attack on peaceable Apaches,
coming soon after President Grant's Peace Policy had been announced, made it clear that any Apaches on reservations would
require constant protection.
Lieutenant Colonel George Crook, who had gained fame in
the Paiute wars, and who had perfected techniques that would be
useful against the Apaches, was named commander of the Arizona
military district in June 1871. He began preparing for a winter
campaign, but had to delay it twice while Peace Policy emissaries
Vincent Colyer and General o. O. Howard tried to settle the
Apaches on reservations by persuasion. Crook resented this interference, for he was convinced that the incorrigible hostiles would
never accept reservation life until they had been thoroughly
beaten in their own favorite refuges. Many Apaches, including
Cochise and the Chiricahuas, the Mimbrefios and Mogollones,
and the Coyoteros of the White mountain region, did settle down
peacefully on the reservations Colyer and Howard established
for them. Some, but not all, worked hard to become self-sufficient.
As Crook had foreseen, however, bands of hostiles remained at
large and continued raiding.
Before he was ordered to suspend operations Crook had made
a rapid survey of Apacheria and had sent out one military detachment employing Coyotero Apaches as scouts. This was an
innovation, for the scouts employed earlier were from other
tribes. The officer in command of the detachment was most enthusiastic, saying that the Apache scouts had exceeded his "most
sanguine" expectations, and were eager to take part in the fighting. Here was the key to the conquest of the Apaches, and Crook
was quick to grasp it-using Apaches to fight Apaches, not simply
as scouts to locate hostile camps. When Colyer and Howard had
settled the majority of the Arizona and Gilefio Apaches on reser-
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vations, Crook was authorized to proceed with his plans to subdue
the hostiles.
Many of the renegades were T ontos, and Crook designed his
campaign against them by sending a number of independent
columns, crossing and recrossing their country, forcing them into
the Tonto Basin, where the final blows were struck. He chose his
officers, his Apache scouts and their white chiefs of scouts, and
his pack mules with equal care and deliberation; he informed his
officers of his intentions, then did not interfere with them. In a
few months of the hardest campaigning through the winter of
1872-1873 his columns harassed the Tontos so severely that all
but a few die-hards came to Camp Verde to surrender. In these
campaigns the companies of Apache scouts took an active part
in the fighting, and the rueful T ontos admitted that it was fear
of Apaches, not Anglo soldiers, that had driven them to surrender.
During the next few years Crook's main concern was helping
the Apaches adjust to reservation life, by keeping them busy digging irrigation ditches, farming, and raising livestock. If Crook
had remained in charge of them for ten years there probably would
have been no further serious Apache troubles. But in 1874 the
Apaches were transferred from the War Department to the Indian
Bureau, and in the following year Crook was sent to the Department of the Platte to fight the Sioux. The Apaches became pawns
in unfortunate struggles between the Army and the Indian
Bureau, for control, and between the contractors of Tucson and
New Mexico, for profits.
•
What revived Apache warfare more than anything else was the
Indian Bureau's fatal decision to concentrate most of the Apaches
at San Carlos reservation in Arizona. This policy ignored not
only all of the promises made to the various bands by Colyer and
Howard, but even worse, it cast hostile bands together on a single
reservation, thereby multiplying the possibilities for trouble. The
San Carlos region was, furthermore, distasteful to many of the
bands which had been reasonably content on reservations in their
own lands. This was especially true of the Camp Verde IndiansTontos, Apache-Yumas or Hualapais, and Apache-Mohaves or
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Yavapais-the Coyoteros of the White mountains, the Chiricahuas,
and the Warm Spring Mimbrefios and their kinsmen, the Mogallones. Crook and other knowledgeable officers warned against
the dire consequences of this policy, but the Indian Bureau blandly ignored their warnings.
The Camp Verde Indians were the first victims of the concentration policy, for they were forced to leave their reservation,
where they had dug miles of irrigation ditches and cleared and
planted extensive fields. Their irritation was such that en route
a fight broke out between the Tontos and the other two groups
in which a number were killed and wounded. Because of army
interference at Camp Apache, the Indian Bureau ordered the
Coyoteros moved from their mountain region to the semi-desert
of San Carlos, where brash but able young John P. Clum had
successfully resisted army interference. This move placed the
Coyoteros out of range of the New Mexico contractors and within
easy reach of those of Tucson. Then came the Chiricahuas from
their reservation in southwestern Arizona, to be followed by the
Mimbrefios and Mogollones from Warm Spring reservation in
New Mexico. The Camp Verde Indians were at first troublesome,
but Clum, with his loyal Apache police and without help from
the cavalry, induced them to settle down and surrender their
weapons. Clum's ability to control the Apaches was indeed extraordinary, but his ambition caused him to promote the policy of
concentrating all Apaches at San Carlos under his own jurisdiction.
The Chiricahuas were the most dangerous of the various bands.
On his visit to Cochise's stronghold, General Howard had persuaded them to accept a reservation in their own country along the
Mexican border. At Cochise's insistence, Howard appointed his
close friend Thomas Jeffords as agent, giving him sole control
of the Chiricahuas, thereby removing them completely from
military jurisdiction. As long as Cochise lived, he and Jeffords
were able to keep the Chiricahuas in line, although they made no
effort to become self-supporting, and some of them occaSionally
joined renegades from other bands on raids into Sonora.
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Mter one such raid Skinyea, his brother Pionsenay, and others
bought whiskey from an Indian trader, and in the drunken rioting
that followed Pionsenay killed several of his people. He atoned
for this a few days later by killing the trader and his assistant,
then led a party of warriors on a rampage through the San
Pedro valley, killing a number of ranchers.
This frightening outbreak prompted widespread demands that
the Chiricahuas be moved to San Carlos or elsewhere. Because
of pressure from Governor A. P. K. Safford, the Indian Bureau
ordered Clum to effect the removal with his Apache police. Clum
insisted that troops be stationed in the area to protect citizens in
case the Chiricahuas stampeded, then marched fifty-four of his
Apaches to Tucson, where they waited for the troops to get into
position. The citizens of Tucson were so impressed by the discipline and general demeanor of the Apache police that they purchased uniforms of red shirts and white trousers for them. This
took place, it should be remembered, only five years after the
Camp Grant massacre, and one of the principal figures among the
police was the Arivaipa chief, Eskiminzin, who had lost most of
his family at Camp Grant.
Clum, his police, and a cavalry escort conducted most of the
Chiricahuas to San Carlos, but Geronimo, Juh, Nolgee, and
others of a related southern band fled into Mexico, to continue
their raiding. They frequently visited the Mimbrenos and Mogollones at Warm Spring, where they rested between raids and disposed of stolen livestock. They also drew rations from the agency.
Because of the continued raids in southern Arizona, early in
1877 the territorial legislature authorized Governor Safford to
enlist a company of sixty men to combat hostiles and protect
ranchers and miners. Safford, who, like the Tucson citizens, had
been greatly impressed by the discipline and effectiveness of the
Apache police, requested Clum to delegate sixty of them to serve
as the territorial militia. The Apache police under their white
captain, Clay Beauford, served until Clum was obliged to recall
them for another assignment of even greater importance. But the
fact that after only a few years of reservation life, and within a
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decade of the Camp Grant massacre, Apaches were called on to
protect the citizens of Arizona from other Apaches is surely one
of the most astonishing reversals of roles of the Apache wars.
Clum's assignment was to march the four hundred miles to
Warm Spring with his Apache police and to seize Geronimo,
Juh, and the other renegades. With one hundred of his police,
Clum made the capture before any troops arrived on the scene.
This w~s the only time in the Apache campaigns that Geronimo
was actually captured, although on other occasions he was persuaded to surrender and return voluntarily to the reservation. At
the time of his capture the Indian Bureau, at Clum's suggestion,
ordered him to move the Warm Spring Apaches to San Carlos
as well. Some of them fled, but those who made the unwelcome
journey took the precaution of hiding their weapons in case of
subsequent need.
On his triumphal arrival at San Carlos, Clum, who had been
enraged at the slightest army interference with reservation activities, found that in his absence the Indian Bureau had agreed
to allow the army to station troops at San Carlos to oversee his
administration. He issued an ultimatum to the Indian Bureau,
demanding a salary commensurate with his increased responsibilities and authorization to enlist more Apache police, offering
at the same time to take full responsibility for controlling all
Apaches in Arizona without any support by the army. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs did not reply to these demands, so
Clum resigned and left the Indian service. No other Arizona
Indian agent but Jeffords had Clum's gift for managing Apaches,
and within a few years all of the progress made had been jeopardized by costly outbreaks from San Carlos.
When Juh and other renegades slipped into San Carlos to
remove their families, the Warm Spring Apaches made a dash
for their homeland in New Mexico. Some surrendered"and were
taken to Warm Spring, then to Mescalero. There Victorio joined
them, apparently satisfied to remain there, but a combination of
unexpected circumstances changed his outlook. He was informed
that he was under indictment for murder in Grant County, and
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that officials would probably come to arrest him. A few days later
Judge Warren Bristol, Albert J. Fountain, and another man
crossed the Mescalero reservation on a hunting and fishing trip.
Victorio was convinced they were coming to arrest him, and fled
with his people and some Mescalero warriors. They ran off the
entire herd of cavalry horses from the Ninth Cavalry post at
Ojo Caliente.
Troops converged on southwestern New Mexico, but those
detachments that confronted Victorio's warriors did so to their
sorrow, for most were soundly thrashed. The Apaches' movements were incredibly swift, for when they wore out their
horses they quickly acquired fresh ones from ranches, and on
foot in the mountains they were as fleet and elusive as deer. On
one occasion a company of Apache scouts caught up with Victorio and part of his force, fighting an all-day battle and killing
some of his ablest warriors. Until this time he had not been
pinned down or defeated, but he could not replace his lost men,
and his fortunes suffered a steady decline thereafter. Between
1879, when he fled Mescalero, and 188 I, when Mexican troops
killed him (or he took his own life) at Tres Castillos, he eluded
or fought off thousands of troops and civilian parties on both sides
of the border in one of the most extraordinary guerrilla campaigns
in the history of warfare. After his death old Nana continued to
lead the survivors, until he, too, was run to earth.
Meanwhile, Geronimo, Juh, Chato, Nolgee and other southern
Chiricahuas carried on raids on both sides of the border, escaping,
when hard-pressed, into the impenetrable refuges of the Sierra
Madre of Sonora.
When General Crook returned to take charge of the Apache
campaigns in Arizona in 1882, he negotiated with Mexican officials for permission to pursue Apache renegades into the Sierra
Madre. By sending a large force of Apache scouts under able
officers accompanied by a few troops, he was able to induce the
Chiricahuas and their allies to surrender, but Geronimo and a
few irreconcilables slipped away at the last minute and returned
to the mountains. At this time General Nelson A. Miles replaced

WORCESTER: APACHES IN THE SOUTHWEST

39

Crook as departmental commander. Miles, like many high-ranking
army officers who were unfamiliar with conditions in Arizona,
had resented Crook's reliance on Apaches for fighting men, considering it a reflection on the army's ability to defeat the Apaches.
But even though Miles was more liberally supplied with troops
than Crook had been, he soon found that without Apache scouts
he could accomplish little. He relied on them as much as necessary, but de-emphasized that fact.
Miles made himself a hero to Arizona citizens by rounding up
the peaceable reservation Chiricahuas and shipping them off to
Fort Marion in Florida. When Geronimo and those with him
fi J1 ally surrendered, they were also sent to Florida, but not to rejoin their families, as Miles had promised. As soon as Geronimo's
band was on board the train, Miles, who claimed credit for the
surrender, disarmed the Apache scouts and loaded them unceremoniously on the same train to accompany the renegades into
Florida exile. This act of treachery was widely denounced, but
the Apache prisoners of war languished in Florida and Alabama
for years. Ultimately they were sent to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and
in 1913 some were allowed to move to the Mescalero reservation
in New Mexico. They were never allowed to return to their former homelands in Arizona and the Mimbres valley of New Mexico.

WRITINGS on the Apaches began as early as 1630, when Spanish
priests such as Alonso de Benavides described them with considerable respect. 6 As the hatred between Spaniards and Apaches
grew intense, however, Spanish accounts generally denounced the
Apaches as cruel and treacherous, although they occasionally reflected grudging admiration. 7 Mter Mexican independence, Mexican accounts usually emphasized the continuous destruction of
ranches and towns, and the capture of women and children. 8
The first American accounts of the Apaches were reserved and
descriptive, such as Governor Charles Bent's report of 1846, but
when warfare broke out there were many recommendations for a
policy of removal or extermination. In the 1850'S a few men,
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such as Kit Carson, Dr. Michael Steck, and other Indian agents,
defended the Apaches and expressed conndence in their ability
to adapt and to support themselves if given the opportunity. Some
army officers in their reminiscences referred to the Apaches in
pejorative terms, but John C. Cremony also described their
abilities with unconcealed admiration. Among the men engaged
in mining and other activities in southern Arizona were both exponents of extermination, such as Sylvester Mowry and William
S. Oury, and men who believed that the Apaches were as wronged
as wrongful, such as Charles D. Poston and Raphael Pumpelly.
After the Civil War the extermination policy continued. The
attitude of General Halleck, Commander of the Division of the
Pacinc, was typical: "It is useless to negotiate with these Apache
Indians. . . . With them there is no alternative but active and
vigorous war, till they are completely destroyed, or forced to surrender as prisoners of war."9 But Lieutenant Colonel George
Crook wrote in 1871, "I think that the Apache is painted in darker
colors than he deserves, and that his villainies arise more from a
misconception of facts than from his being worse than other
Indians."lo
After the Apaches were all settled on reservations they made a
genuine effort to support themselves by farming and stock-raising,
showing early successes in both. There was, among the former
Apache warriors, much less resistance to labor than there was
among other warlike Indians, such as the Teton Sioux, when
they were reduced to reservation life and forced to give up the
bow for the hoe. If the Indian Bureau had not introduced the
unfortunate concentration policy, and if the Apaches had remained under the guidance of men like either Crook or Clum, it
seems likely that their adjustment to reservation life would have
been rapid and complete.
The earliest studies of an ethnographic nature made of the
Apaches were mostly by well-educated army officers such as Captain John Bourke, Crook's aide. Bourke's classic, On The Border
with Crook, contains a vast store of ethnological data as well as
a historical narrative of the 1870'S and 1880'S.11 These were
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followed, in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, by
scientific works of professional anthropologists such as Albert
R. Reagan,t2 the late Grenville Goodwin, Morris E. Opler, and
many others.
The Apaches have attracted a great many writers using a
variety of approaches, and an Apache bibliography would make
a substantial volume. Articles number in the hundreds; in the
first twenty-five volumes of the New Mexico Historical Review,
for example, there are twenty-nine articles with "Apache" or the
name of some Apache in the title, and these are only a part of
those that mention or deal with the Apaches. The Journal of
Arizona History and Arizona and the West also contain many
articles on Apaches. The studies of Morris E. Gpler on Apaches,
books and articles, number upwards of forty.·
Two of the early American histories containing chapters on
Apaches are J. P. Dunn, Jr., Massacres of the Mountains (1886)
and H. H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico (1889).
Dunn, .although he stated that "They are entitled to no compassion on the ground of treachery used against them. The Apache
makes war by treachery,"lS admitted that there were wrongs on
both sides. "It must be remembered ... that a large portion of the
white population were as barbarous in their modes of warfare as
the Apaches themselves; that Arizona was still a refuge for the
criminal and lawless men of other states and territories; that war
and pillage had been bred into the Apaches, until they were the
most savage and intractable Indians in the country . . . that
Mexico pursued war in the old way, and still paid bounty for
Apache scalps, no matter where procured; that slavery still existed
in Mexico, and it was next to impossible to recover Indians once
carried across the line."14
Bancroft, writing in the same period, generally regarded the
Apaches as obstacles in the way of inevitable American progress.
But in a footnote in his History of Arizona and New Mexico he
tempered his scorn of the Peace Policy advocates: "Notwithstanding my slighting allusions to Colyer's mission, it must be understood that I do not deny the truth of his allegations that the
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Apaches had been grossly wronged.... A white man's reservation, under Apache control, would be somewhat more in accordance with the eternal principles of justice than the present state
of affairs. I do not blame the Apaches for defending their homes
and liberties in their own way." He added, however, that there
was no reason that the Arizona settlers should submit to plunder
and murder. "There was," he wryly remarked, "ample room for
the application of our limited benevolence and fair treatment
after forcing the Indians to submission. "15
In the past quarter-century there have been an increasing
number of objective studies of the Apaches, and their way of life
and history are becoming better known and appreciated. Among
the more significant works are Frank Lockwood, The Apache
Indians (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938); Morris E.
Opler, An Apache Life-Way: The Economic, Social and Religious
Institutions of the Chiricahua Indians (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1941); C. L. Sonnichsen, The Mescalero Apaches
(Nonnan: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958); Jack D. Forbes,
Apache, Navajo, and Spaniard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960); F. Stanley, The Apaches of New Mexico,
1540-1940 (Pampa, Texas: Pampa Print Shop, 1962); Dan
Thrapp, The Conquest of Apacherfa (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1967) and Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches
(Nonnan: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974); Don Schellie,
Vast Domain of Blood (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1968);
Eve Ball, In the Days of Victoria: Recollections of a Warm
Springs Apache (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1972);
Max Moorhead, The Apache Frontier. Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769-1791 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968); Ralph Hedrick
Ogle, Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970); Henry F.
Dobyns, The Apache People (Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series,
1971) and The Mescalero Apache People (Phoenix: Indian
Tribal Series, 1973); and Dolores A. Gunnerson, The Jicarilla
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Apaches: A Study in Survival (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974).
This is, of course, only a partial list, but these works are representative of the studies being made of the Apaches and their
history. Unique, and in many ways one of the most valuable, is
Eve Ball's account based on her contacts with survivors of the
Apache wars and their willingness to share with her information
and memories usually concealed from whites. Too seldom has
it been possible to obtain and present much in the way of authentic information on the Apache side of the conflict.
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THE INQUISITION IN SPANISH LOUISIANA, 1762-1800

RICHARD E. GREENLEAF

the eighteenth century Louisiana, French and Spanish,
provided one of the major channels for penetration of Enlightenment philosophy and of Protestantism into the Spanish Empire
in North America. While the Bourbon Kings of Spain never were
willing to establish a formal Tribunal of the Holy Office of the
Inquisition in Louisiana, the Spanish government and the tribunals in Mexico City and Cartagena did encourage and commission inquisitorial investigations in Louisiana.!
Prior to 1569 there were no Tribunals of the Inquisition in the
Spanish colonies. In the absence of Inquisitors the responsibility
to punish heresy and proscribed conduct rested with the bishops
or their delegates. The bishop in his role as ecclesiastical judge
ordinary had been charged with preserving orthodoxy within his
diocese since medieval times-before the formal establishment
of the Inquisition. In early colonial Mexico in areas where there
was no resident bishop or where his see was two days travel away,
prelates of the Orders were given special faculties to exercise
quasi-episcopal powers including the right to perform as ordinaries.
After King Philip II established a Tribunal of the Inquisition in
Mexico in 1569, the bishops and prelates relinquished their early
powers over heresy and immoral conduct, except in the remote
periphery of New Spain which came to include New Mexico,
Texas, California, and finally Louisiana. 2 In 1610 the Spanish
monarchy established an Inquisition Tribunal in Cartagena with
jurisdiction over the modern-day areas of Venezuela and Colombia as well as the islands of the Caribbean. 3 Since Spanish Florida
DURING
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was suffragan to Cuba, the nominal enforcement of orthodoxy
there was the province of the Bishop of Cuba or his delegates.
During the entire seventeenth century the tribunal at Cartagena
busied itself with schemes to extend its jurisdiction and engaged
in active rivalry with the Mexico City tribunal for control of the
prosecution of heresy in the Southeast Borderlands. Henry C. Lea
said of the Cartagena judges: "the history of the Tribunal is to
be found not so much in its autos de fe as in the guerrilla war
which for a century it maintained with the authorities, civil and
ecclesiastical."4 As early as 1606 the Mexican tribunal had a
Comisario of the Holy Office in Havana, four years before the
Cartagena Inquisition was founded. This Commissary clashed
with the Bishop of Cuba over jurisdiction in Florida. In 1621 the
Cartagena Inquisitor Agustin Ugarte y Saravia sent the governor
of Florida two carte blanche appointments of a commissary and a
familiar (Inquisition policeman), inviting the Governor to fill in
the names of two appropriate men to occupy the positions. 5 Eventually, in 1692, the Cartagena judges appointed Fray Pedro de Lima
comisario in Florida, but as recent archival discoveries have indicated, Pedro de Lima secretly obeyed the Mexican Commissary of
the Holy Office in Puebla rather than his superiors on the north coast
of South America. Pedro de Lima's role as Commissary of the Inquisition was challenged by the Cuban bishop and the Spanish governor of Florida. In the end they were able to convince the Council
of the Indies to revoke Lima's authority in 1695.6 The Cartagena
tribunal did not let the matter rest there, however, and during
the eighteenth century consistently endeavored to place agents
in the Floridas and Louisiana. After France's cession of Louisiana to Spain in 1762, the Mexican and Cartagena tribunals vied
for spiritual control there.
Between 1680 and 1762, the era of French domination in
Louisiana, the Mexican Tribunal of the Inquisition took the
initiative in containing "the French Menace." In the decades after
the founding of New Orleans in 1718, French traders began to
invade the borderlands of New Spain hoping to penetrate the
Spanish colonial mercantile system and to form alliances with key
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Indian groups along the river systems. French diplomacy among
the Comanche tribes and the traders who traveled from New
Orleans to Santa Fe after the 1730's caused great anxiety in the
Mexican viceroyalty. As early as 1743 the viceroy ordered that
Frenchmen who incited Indians against Spanish authority be remanded to the Inquisition for trial. 7 It became the custom of the
Mexican Holy Office to appoint commissaries at each of the central and east Texas missions and presidios. We have lists of these
individuals from 173 I until 1807. These records show that the
Mexican Inquisition had agents in Adaes, Nacogdoches and Nachitoches from the 1750'S onward. s As early as 1762 the comisarios
were sending confiscated books to Mexico City for examination
by the Holy Office. 9 In 1756 they had given the Mexican Inquisition and the viceroy detailed lists of foreigners who were infiltrating T exas. 10 The great fear in Mexico was not the incursion
of Frenchmen per se but of the Enlightenment political and social
ideas which they might bring with them, ideas which struck at
the very heart of the Spanish power structure in Mexico. l l This
fear somewhat moderated in 1760 when the French House of
Bourbon entered into a "family compact" with the Spanish Bourbon kings, and the two countries began to coordinate their
diplomacies. Nevertheless the Holy Office of the Inquisition continued to view the ideas of the French philosophers with great suspicion. 12
At the time France ceded Louisiana to Spain, the Spanish state
was tolerant of French political philosophy, social ideas, and
French Protestantism. Immigration of non-Catholics and foreigners was encouraged. Non-Spanish soldiers often served in Louisiana regiments, and after 1782 the port of New Orleans was
opened to free trade with France and with the rest of Spain's
empire. The new governors in Louisiana and the Church adopted
a posture of liberalism and flexible orthodoxy, and there were no
known inquisitorial investigations in Spanish Louisiana until
the 1790'S. Spanish religion and Spanish Catholic culture were
protected in other ways.
Political officialdom attempted to curb sedition and seditious
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ideas, a function that Mexican viceroys and the Inquisition usually shared after 1760. The usual jurisdiction of the Inquisition
(preserving religious orthodoxy, supervising the moral conduct
of laymen and clergy, and attacking blasphemy and bigamy) was
the purview of the ordinary in Louisiana, and since there was
no bishop this power was delegated to an auxiliary vicar. A perusal
of the records of the Diocese of Louisiana and the Floridas from
1576 to 1803 reveals that vicars took this responsibility seriously.13
Most severe breaches of moral conduct were referred to the ecclesiastical courts of the ordinary in Havana. Periodic episcopal
visitations of peninsular Florida, west Florida, and Louisiana
detail the permissiveness of Catholicism in the Southeast Borderlands. In the 1730'S the Auxiliary Bishop of Florida deplored the
inRux of English traders who feigned Catholicism but who actually proselytized their Protestant beliefs and undermined the
faith of Spanish colonists and Indians alike. 14 Franciscan friars
and diocesan clergy, many of whom carne from the Puebla friaries
and missionary colleges in Mexico, had their own means of disciplining blatant culprits. Some were lured under various pretexts
to Veracruz or other Mexican ports where the Commissaries of
the Holy Office could deal with them. For instance, in 1746
Francisca Zapata, accused of practicing sorcery all along the Gulf
Coast from her headquarters in Punta de Ziguenza, modern Pensacola, Florida, was tried when she visited Mexico. 15
What is often evident from the Mexican and Spanish Inquisition records is that there was a close circum-Caribbean surveillance
of Catholics and foreigners alike who Routed religious orthodoxy
and the power of the Spanish state. Inhabitants of Louisiana who
talked heresy or sedition-and often they were the same thingwere arrested and tried by the Inquisition once they left horne
on business or other travel. Cuban authorities, the Mexican Inquisition Commissaries, and officials in Yucatan and Central
America were informed of the culprits in question by an effective
communications network. Very often the comisarios sought out
such travelers, and on occasion the accused were persuaded to
mend their ways.
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In 1780 a Protestant merchant, Enrique Extempli, was induced
to seek to convert to Catholicism "spontaneously." He was incarcerated in the Fortress of San Juan de Ulua, where he was allowed
to talk to the Calificador and Commissary of the Holy Office in
Veracruz, Don Jose Marfa Laso de la Vega. I6 The presidio was
then full of sailors and merchants who had been hauled in for
violating Spanish commercial regulations. Perhaps one of the
Jews in this predicament gave Enrique the idea of converting
to Catholicism in order to escape his sorry lot. He told the Commissary a very convincing story and apparently succeeded in
getting out of jail.
From the trial record we learn that Enrique Extempli was a
twenty-four-year-old Englishman from Fellin who had been a
merchant in the British Natchez area for ten years. At the age of
fourteen he had left home and his Lutheran parents to seek his
fortune in the New World. He was in and out of jail in Spanish
territory many times, usually charged with illegal trading. He had
spent a year in prison in New Orleans before being deported,
first to Havana and then to Cadiz as an undesirable alien. From
Cadiz he and his partner Stephen Howard returned to the Gulf
Coast. There he was apprehended again and sent to San Juan de
Ulua. The boy said he first encountered Catholicism and went to
Mass during his stints in New Orleans, Havana, and in Spain.
It was when he began to learn Spanish and to find his place
among Spaniards that he had realized the superiority of Spanish religion and culture. He had known other "heretics" in the
Caribbean but he eschewed their ways and he truly wished to
convert.
In his lengthy interrogation, Dr. Laso de la Vega followed the
prescribed formulary for those who wished to renounce their
previous beliefs and to become Catholics. 17 Laso de la Vega skillfully learned of the young man's Lutheran background, his early
education in England, and his travels in the New World. Extempli believed in the virginity of Mary, before, during, and after
the birth of Christ, but he had been taught that she was the
mother of other children. He believed in the sacrament of bap-
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tism, but not in penance or the Eucharist. He denied the existence of Purgatory, the efficacy of indulgences, and the intercession of saints. He held the usual unacceptable Lutheran views
on the power of the Pope, veneration of images, authority of
bishops, and salvation through good works. Dr. Laso de la Vega
certified to the Mexico City Tribunal of the Inquisition that
Extempli was sincere in his desire to convert. The judges instructed Laso to make very sure that his prisoner was not a Jew in
disguise and that he was not making his peace with the Church
out of sheer expediency. A group of Veracruz clergy were appointed to instruct Extempli in Catholicism. When they certified
that he was ready, a simple ceremony in the portico of the Veracruz
cathedral, on September 29, 178o, absolved him of previous sins
and errors and admitted him to the body of believers. One of the
frustrating aspects of trials of this sort is that the record leaves off
at this point, and the Natchez merchant fades from historical
view.
Mexican Inquisition records show that many merchants under
surveillance never came to trial. A case in point was the 1783
probe into activities of Francisco Lopez, a creole entrepeneur of
Florida who roamed the Caribbean and Mexico on business. I8
LOpez was denounced to the Mexican Holy Office from Havana
on July 29, 1783, when Fray Jose de Santa Teresa related statements Lopez had made in Cuban bars. LOpez had argued that
"only God knows the true religion of man." He and his cohorts
were living in doctrinal error even though they were Catholics.
Mexican Inquisitors Mier y Villar and Bergosa y Jordan studied
the denunciation and concluded that, for the time .being, the
evidence was insufficient for them to proceed. It is obvious that
some of the information gathered about Extempli and Lopez
probably came from clergy in New Orleans. There was one
formally accredited Comisario of the Inquisition in New Orleans
in the late 1780'S and probably other informal agents who collected and dispatched information to the south and east by sea,
and to the west through the chains of missions and presidios.
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The Commissary of the Holy Office in Louisiana was the
famous and controversial Capuchin friar Antonio de Sedella who
had arrived in New Orleans with a group of Andalusian Capuchins in 178 I .19 Owing to his conflicts with ecclesiastical superiors
and with the Spanish governor a decade later, there exists a body
of data on "Pere Antoine's" career as an Inquisitor. Most Louisiana historians have mentioned these events, but few have seen
them in the perspective of Caribbean Inquisition history. What
is clear from diocesan records is that long before his clashes with
Governor Esteban Mira in I 790 over his status as Commissary
of the Holy Office, Pere Antoine was acting as judge in cases
normally handled by the Inquisition in New Spain. During May
of 1786 Governor Mira acknowledged reports Sedella sent him
about investigations of faith and morals conducted under his
jurisdiction as Auxiliary Vicar of New Orleans. 20 These prosecutions dealt with blasphemy, bigamy, reading of books on the
Index, and lack of orthodoxy among the Indian population of
Spanish Louisiana. In an official communication dated May 8,
1788, Sedella used the title "Vicar and Ecclesiastical Judge of
New Orleans."21 The records show that Pere Antoine was conducting heresy investigations under the episcopal jurisdiction of
Ordinary, and often circumvented proper judicial channels within
the hierarchy, thereby netting himself criticism from his Florida
and Cuban superiors. The difference between such prosecutions
and Inquisition business was merely semantic, and they were
designed perhaps to allay the fears of foreigners and non-Catholics in Louisiana.
On February 10, 1786, the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the
Inquisition at Cartagena officially notified Fray Antonio de Sedella of his appointment as Commissary of the Holy Office in
Louisiana.22 This was the culmination of a century of effort on
the part of Cartagena Inquisitors to extend their jurisdiction onto
the mainland of North America. Contrary to the opinion of earlier
writers on Spanish Louisiana, Sedella's appointment as Comisario
did not imply the establishment of an Inquisition court in New

52

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW L:1 1975

Orleans. Rather it meant that Pere Antoine was to be the accredited
representative of the Cartagena Tribunal there and he was to
behave, as all Comisarios did, only as an investigatory agent. When
the Auxiliary Bishop of the Spanish Floridas, Sedella's superior,
heard of the commission· he protested the action vigorously.23
Cyril de Barcelona enlisted the support of the Captain General
of Cuba and of his ecclesiastical superior in Havana, Bishop
Santiago Echevarria. All three functionaries pointed out that the
population of Spanish Louisiana was composed largely of Frenchmen and foreign merchants, many of whom were non-Catholics.
Bishop Echevarria suspended Sedella's patent as Commissary until
a ruling regarding formalized Inquisition activity in Louisiana
could be obtained from Spain. In a petition dated July 13, 1787,
Cyril de Barcelona requested Charles III to decide the matter.
Charles upheld the suspension of Sedella's appointment on
January 9, 1788, and the Cuban hierarchy so notified Pere Antoine. 24 Sedella acknowledged receipt of the King's order and
there the matter rested for two years.
Conflict between Sedella and his Auxiliary Bishop in Florida
over the Inquisition patent led to hard feelings between the two
men. Animosities intensified when Sedella polarized the New
Orleans clergy into Andalusian and Havana groups. Partially as
a result of this factionalism, but largely owing to reports of the
deplorable state of religious life in the colony, Auxiliary Bishop
Cyril de Barcelona journeyed to Louisiana and launched a
personal investigation. His episcopal visitation began on August
30, 1789, and continued throughout 1790. The Cuban superior
had empowered Cyril to send Sedella back to Havana if his findings would warrant it. The Auxiliary Bishop brought charges
against Sedella for mismanagement of his Vicariate in New
Orleans and determined to relieve him of office. 25
Because Pere Antoine had a large popular following in New
Orleans and public scandal was imminent as the proceedings unfolded, Cyril was willing to strike a compromise with the rebellious Sedella. The arrangement, as the bishop reported it in
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his letters to Havana and to Spain was that he had agreed to
withdraw charges in exchange for Sedella's promise to return to
Spain "of his own free will." Cyril claimed that as the ship was
waiting to take him away, Pere Antoine reneged on the deal
avowing "that if he went at all it would be as a prisoner under
official guard."26 Exasperated, he complained to Governor Esteban
Mira about Pere Antoine's behavior and requested that Mira
arrange for deportation. Meanwhile Sedella's ship set sail for
Spain without its illustrious passenger.
At this juncture the real controversy over Antonio de Sedella's
status as Inquisition Commissary began. Governor Mira was
aware that Sedella's 1786 appointment had been nullified, and
he was flabbergasted when Pere Antoine confronted him with a
document which seemed to reinstate him as Inquisitor of Spanish
Louisiana. As the French Revolution gained momentum and as
a spate of books and revolutionary tracts issued forth from France,
the Spanish Inquisition felt constrained to curtail their circulation
in the empire. Consequently the Inquisitor General of Spain
issued specific instructions to Holy Office Tribunals in the New
World and to their Commissaries to confiscate all subversive literature. Ignoring the revocation of Sedella's authority in 1787,
the Spanish Tribunal sent Pere Antoine a direct order on December 5, 1789, to search for and to seize suspected materials. 27
By April 1790 the order had arrived in New Orleans and Sedella used it as a lever in his developing controversy with Governor Mira and Bishop Cyril de Barcelona. In a dramatic move,
and one suspects with great bravado, Pere Antoine went to the Governor's residence at nine o'clock on the evening of April 29, showed
him the order from Spain, and tried to give Mira instructions on
how the order was to be enforced: 28
To carry into effect instructions of December 5' in conformity with
His Majesty's wishes expressed in the instructions ... it is necessary
that I have recourse at any hour of the night to the Corps de Garde
from which I may draw the necessary troops to assist me if they are
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necessary to carryon my operations. To this end Your Lordship will
please issue the necessary instructions to the military commander
that he must furnish me immediately the soldiers whom I may request to carry out my duties.

Sedella left the residence before the Governor could finish reading the documents.
The next day Pere Antoine escalated the controversy and kept
the pressure on Governor Miro. He issued another formal order
to Don Esteban at six o'clock in the afternoon of April 29, 1790.29
Reviewing the contents of the request he had delivered twentyone hours earlier, he threatened:
Since at the time of this writing I have not received any communication from Your Lordship . . . I deem it necessary to warn you
that the success of my mission is imperiled by such tardy measures,
and since this matter is of the gravest concern and of the utmost importance to the service of the King, Your Lordship will please inform me without further delay what steps you intend to take so that
I may proceed promptly to accomplish my task.

Perhaps, as he claimed later, Governor Miro feared that Sedella
might trigger insurrection and economic disaster in Louisiana
if he carried out his Inquisitorial functions. Certainly Pere Antoine had strong support from large numbers of the colonists and
among the Louisiana clergy; and both Miro and the bishop feared
that Sedella was further polarizing an already divided clerical
establishment. The Capuchin also had powerful allies on the
Governor's staff. Miro later confided to the crown that his own
auditor was one of Sedella's confidants and chief supporters. At
any rate the Governor decided to use the occasion to justify ridding
his government of a rebellious and intriguing friar who was Vicar
of New Orleans and a pretender to inquisitorial authority. After
duly consulting with his legal counselor, Manuel Serrano, Colonel
Manuel Gayoso of Natchez, and others, Miro empowered Cyril
de Barcelona to order the arrest of Antonio de Sedella. On the night
of April 29, 1790, Pere Antoine was secretly arrested and "forcibly
marched to a ship" bound for Cadiz;30
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Because of Sedella's popularity in New Orleans, and fonnal
protests lodged in Cuba and in Spain, the issue became a political
cause celebre. Both Bishop Cyril de Barcelona and Governor
Mira were called to account for their actions. Each seemed to
blame the other for the actual decision to deport Pere Antoine.
The Reverend Michael J. Curley, who examined the canonical
process against Sedella, found it "strangely unconvincing" and
came to the same conclusion that the Auxiliary Bishop's superior
did when he reprimanded the visitor for exceeding his powers,
violating proper legal procedures, and arranging for Sedella to be
deported. 31 Governor Esteban Mira defended his actions in a
lengthy dossier sent to the Spanish Minister of Justice and Pardons Antonio Porlier in 1790. On the surface his defense was
an able one. He recounted, with adequate documentation, the
Auxiliary Bishop's recommendations for Pere Antoine's forced
departure and then focused on the more serious issue of Sedella's
intended inquisitorial activities. The Governor wrote that when
he read Sedella's nocturnal demand for troops to search for and
to seize heretical literature, "I trembled at such an attempt to
ignore the prerogatives of the Royal Patronage, but above all because it happened at such a critical time in these provinces."32
Governor Mira argued convincingly to Minister Porlier that
Antonio de Sedella's attempt to extend the Inquisition's activities
into Louisiana endangered the policies dictated by the monarchy
for the purpose of encouraging immigration and stimulating
commerce with foreigners-who were apt to be non-Catholics. The
Governor contended that any hint of Inquisition operations in
Louisiana would be injurious to trade and future settlement: 33
these foreigners are imbued with, and very frightened of the power
of the Holy Office which they consider absolutely despotic and discriminatory, notwithstanding the uprightness, stature, and circumspection of its most just proceedings.

Certainly Mira was correct in his assessment of the religious
temperament of foreigners in the Louisiana colony, but just as
surely he exaggerated the extent of Pere Antoine's machinations.

56

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW L:1 1975

The documentary record shows that Sedella had no intention of
establishing an Inquisition, nor was he trying to install himself
as Chief Inquisitor. He merely hoped to use his status as Comisario
of the Holy Office and its immunities in order to avoid deportation. Neither Governor Mir6 nor subsequent historians of Louisiana have seen these incidents in their correct light: 34 a conflict
between Spanish civil authority and the institution known as the
Familiatura, that corpus of privileges and immunities from civil
jurisdiction enjoyed by Commissaries of the Inquisition and
familiars under Spanish legal codes. 35
Pere Antoine's deportation did not end his Inquisitorial activities, for he was allowed to return to New Orleans in 1795. It
appears that this time he carried some secret commission from the
Mexico City Tribunal. He supplied information on heretics and
prohibited literature which often led to arrest and trial of Louisianians when they traveled the Caribbean in trade and commerce.
Even after Louisiana was returned to France in 1800 and after
the purchase of Louisiana by the United States in 1803, Sedella
continued as an agent. Letters from him to the Governor of Yucatan and to the Mexican Inquisition are dated as late as 1806. They
describe heretical literature in New Orleans destined for shipment to Mexico, give information about the seditious plots of
fugitives from the Mexican Inquisition in New Orleans. 36
The underlying issue in the jurisdictional dispute had been
Sedella's commission to confiscate seditious literature. From the
Holy Office's standpoint, fear of French literature and other Enlightenment tracts was well founded. Inventories of plantation
libraries, discovered and published in modern times, attest to the
presence of all manner of avant-garde reading matter from the
1730'S onward. Allegations that colonial Louisiana was a provincial backwater, culturally destitute, are simply not true. 37
The 1769 inventory of the estate of M. Prevost, agent of the
Company of the Indies in New Orleans for thirty years, listed
some three hundred titles of books, primarily works of social
and political philosophy with a decidedly radical tint. Prevost and
his family read Montesquieu, Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau, and
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many other authors who were prohibited in Mexico and Spain. 3s
After 1789, proscribed French political and economic tracts, as
well as pamphlets against the Spanish state, infiltrated New
Spain from the free ports of Louisiana and Cuba. Governors
and clergy in New Orleans wrote letters to the Mexican Inquisition in the 1790'S warning about the inHux of prohibited books,
and the Inquisitors in Mexico City expressed concern about New
Orleans as a center for political intrigue.39 From 1794 onward the
Governors of Florida, Louisiana, and Cuba were instructed by
the Viceroy of New Spain and by the Council of the Indies in
Spain to prohibit the book trade which had developed from
Philadelphia via New Orleans and the United States border. 40
In 179 I Felipe Santiago Puglia published in Philadelphia a
particularly damning indictment of the ancien regime and the
Spanish monarchy entitled £1 Desengano del Hombre. Copies of
the tract were circulated in New Orleans. The Holy Office condemned the book in 1794 in no uncertain terms. 41 The censors
said Puglia was taking cheap shots at the Spanish monarchy and
fomenting "rebellion of the most infamous sort." His attempt to
induce loyal Spaniards to use the French Revolution as a model
was attacked with great vehemence. The censor tried to show
that liberty and happiness had not resulted from the French uprisings, but only desolation and spiritual "pestilences."42 Concern
with sedition and seditious literature from upriver was also evident
in the documents of the diocesan archives from the 1790'S. For
instance, on September 30, 1796, Fr. Paul de Sant Pierre wrote
a disquieting letter from St. Genevieve, Missouri, to Bishop
Pefialver in New Orleans. He had just heard that mobs of "mad
Frenchmen" had been demonstrating in Saint Louis during the
last few days, "shouting Long Live Liberty, Long Live Equality,
and singing songs against religion." Fr. Paul reported that American agitation in Missouri was reaching a dangerous peak.43
While the Spanish monarchy was attempting to Hispanicize
the stubbornly French Louisiana colony, each year the French
population grew. A large inHux of emigres from Santo Domingo
and elsewhere bolstered the population, and New Orleans alone
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received some four thousand of these people in 1791. The population in the rest of the Louisiana country also grew. Arthur P.
Whitaker studied a census taken by the Bishop of Louisiana in
1797 which reported the population of lower Louisiana and
Natchez as 43,087.44 These Frenchmen, British traders, and
American merchants added to the Francophile and Hispanophobe
feelings in the colony. It was difficult, if not impossible, to contain the spread of heresy and sedition. In these difficult times
of ideological conflict the governor of Louisiana was the coolheaded
and tolerant Manuel Gayoso de Lemos who from 1789 to 1797
had governed the largely Protestant and American section of
Natchez before he assumed his post in New Orleans in 1797.45
Widely read, well-informed on political and economic issues in
North America and Europe, Gayoso continued to promote the
tolerant administrative environment necessary for political stability but damaging to orthodoxy. When Governor Gayoso died
in 1'799 his extensive library was auctioned off in New Orleans. 46 The four hundred and eleven volumes on the inventory
have been analyzed in depth by Irving A. Leonard, who judges
them to be "the working library of a practical man of affairs ...
reflecting Gayoso's varied experience and cosmopolitan culture."
Quite a few of the books were on the Spanish Index of 1790
as "prohibited" or "subject to expurgation."47 It appears that
Governor Gayoso both created and was influenced by the tolerant environment which he engendered.
As the Mexican Inquisition revitalized itself to combat philosophe ideas translated into practice by French Revolutionary
activists after 1789, Spanish Louisiana clergy determined to pursue their previous policy of having heretics and blasphemers arrested after they departed from the colony. By far the most distinguished citizen of New Orleans tried by the Mexican Inquisition was Don Juan Longouran, a native of Bordeaux who had
married into the distinguished and respected Fortier family!8
Longouran had migrated to Louisiana sometime in the late 1760's
and at the time of his trial in Mexico City in 1793, he was fiftyeight years old. For over twenty years he had been married to
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Marie Fortier, who lived in New Orleans with four of their
children. The two eldest, Honorato and Mariana, were living in
France with Longouran's brother while they completed their education. Longouran had graduated from medical school and had
gone into the family business in Bordeaux when he was twentyeight years old. In order not to marry a girl chosen by his father,
Juan had gone to Haiti with a Captain Renart. After that he settled in New Orleans. With his wife he returned to Haiti where
he bought a coffee plantation and forty slaves. Longouran and
Marie returned to New Orleans to live because of an epidemic
which decimated the labor force and because of business reverses. There he practiced medicine and engaged in trade. After
the disastrous fire of 1788, which destroyed their property, Longouran began a career as merchant and Army doctor all over the
Caribbean-in Havana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico. He traveled a great deal, leaving his family in New Orleans. A gregarious
and an opinionated'man, he talked too much about religion and
politics. Baron Carondelet's staff had dossiers on him in Central
America, where the Baron had served prior to his Louisiana post.
The Mexican Inquisition amassed some five hundred pages of
data from Louisiana and Central America during the years
1790 to 1795 on Juan Longouran. On a trip to Santa Cruz Yoro,
Honduras, in 1790, Longouran was house guest of a business
associate when he blatantly expounded heretical ideas. His host
made him leave the house, and the next morning he denounced
him to the Inquisition. Soon thereafter Longouran was jailed in
Honduras and his properties embargoed. Perhaps owing to political influence in Tegucigalpa, he was later released. He then
proceeded to Mexico City where his iconoclastic views again got
him into trouble. It is evident that Dr. Longouran's rationalistic
medical view of the universe and the nature of man had led him
to question religious phenomena. 49 Evidence showed that Don
Juan was a practicing Catholic when it was good for business, but
that in his private life he was; to quote one report, an "obscene and
lascivious" man who scoffed at religion. The Inquisition charged
him with denying the validity of the sacraments of marriage and
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baptism. Don Juan said fornication was not a sin, and that
when men took the women they desired, they simply followed
natural law, which was, after all, the guiding motivation of the
world. He claimed that Hell was nothing more than the labors
and sufferings men undergo in their mortal lives. He opined that
a God of mercy could not save only Christians, for there were
only three and one half million of them in a world of thirty-three
million souls. Such a situation, he explained, would make for a
"small Heaven and very great Hell." He furthermore questioned
the doctrine of the incarnation, the adoration of images, and
various other mysteries of the Faith, saying he would not kiss the
hands of bishops and popes or call for a priest at the hour of his
death. He had spoken at length in favor of the French Revolution,
and claimed it was legal and just to deny obedience to the Papacy.
The Holy Office of the Inquisition made a secret investigation of the Longouran affair, quietly gathering testimony and
keeping the accused under surveillance as a "Protestant" and
"secret spy." Perhaps he escaped immediate censure because the
Holy Office wished to receive more data on his background from
Cuba, Honduras, and Louisiana. As the Reign of Terror in
France intensified, and as the Spanish were preparing to expel
Frenchmen from the viceroyalty, the Holy Office arrested Longouran in Mexico on July 17, 1793, and confiscated his property.
After a long judicial procedure, Juan Longouran was convicted
of heresy and sedition. After he was reconciled in the auto de fe
of August 9, 1795, he made lengthy penance in the Monastery
of the Holy Cross at Queretaro and was finally deported from
Veracruz on April 24, 1798, to serve eight years of exile in a
Spanish prison. Juan Longouran was the typical example of the
learned man who had separated religion and science in his
thinking.
Another member of a prominent New Orleans family, the
Sant-Maxent, almost had serious problems with the Inquisition
in 1795. Francisco Maximiliano de Sant-Maxent, son of the
famous Gilbert Antoine de Sant-Maxent, brother of the Condesa
de Galvez, wife of the Mexican Viceroy, was serving as military
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commander of New Santander in 1795. The whole San Luis
Potosi and Coahuila populace were gossiping about the trials of
Frenchmen by the Mexican Inquisition, especially the case of
Juan Marie Murgier formerly military commander of the province.
Murgier had been jailed by the Holy Office as a heretic and had
committed suicide in order to escape interrogation and punishment. 50 The Commissary of the Holy Office in New Santander,
Fray Manuel Diaz, was investigating other Frenchmen in the area
when he happened to take testimonies about the conduct of
Manuel Maliban, whose case was pending. Witnesses against
Maliban connected Sant-Maxent with Francophile sentiments
and irreverent remarks about Spanish Catholicism. Furthermore,
Sant-Maxent had criticized the Inquisition for its handling of the
Murgier affair. As a result the Comisario alerted the Mexican
Tribunal and a dossier on Sant-Maxent was opened. 51 The Commissary was ordered to gather additional evidence, even though
the suspect had been transferred to Louisiana by the time the investigation got started.
It all began on April 14, 1795, when Manuel Morales Balbuena
told Comisario Dlaz that Maliban and Captain Sant-Maxent held
similar views on religion and politics. Morales Balbuena had
heard this from a Fray Francisco Lopez, who had disputed with the
Captain about the ultimate worth of religious sects and political
systems. Lopez quoted Sant-Maxent as saying only on Judgment
Day would it be clear who were right and who were wrongthe French or the Spanish. As the provincial commissaries continued gathering data more suspicion was focused on the captain,
particularly as gossip intensified. In San Luis Potosi on May 21,
Lt. Col. Silvestre L6pez Portillo appeared before the Commissary
to give testimony which had not been solicited. He told of an
incident related to him by one of Sant-Maxent's officers, which
had occurred while they were on a reconnaissance. They had
stopped to hear Mass and the Captain had jeered at the others:
"Why are you doing this [ridiculous] thing? What do you think
Mass is, anyway? It is nothing more than a ceremony." Scandalized by this story, LOpez scurried to tell the Inquisition. On
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the margin of Lopez' testimony, the Commissary wrote an interesting comment: "This gentleman is known to be a man of more
than usual piety, but he has the defect of a very lively imagination,
and he tends to exaggerate." Obviously the Comisario questioned
whether Lopez Portillo was an enemy of Francisco Sant-Maxent,
and at the very least he felt that LOpez was backbiting.
But still the investigation of Sant-Maxent continued. On May
21, 1796, Vicente Santa Cruz, Captain of the Militia of New
Santander, was induced to testify. The deposition makes it clear
that Lopez Portillo had discussed the Sant-Maxent affair with
him and had, in a sense, recruited Santa Cruz to further inculpate
the Frenchman. Santa Cruz had been present at the Villa de
Aguayo when Sant-Maxent ridiculed the Holy Mass. There the
matter rested for almost ten years. In the meantime Francisco
Maximiliano de Sant-Maxent had been transferred to Louisiana,
and later served as Governor of Pensacola, from 181 I to 18 I 6.
Perhaps as the result of new cycles of Francophobia in the Spanish world after 1800, and most probably because of colonial creole
animosities toward the Galvez family and its policies, the SantMaxent dossier in the Holy Office archive in Mexico City was
reactivated between 1805 and 1809. On March 4, 18°5, the
prosecutor of the Holy Office instructed his staff to gather up-todate information on Sant-Maxent's career since 1795 and to find
out more about the original denunciations.
As a consequence the bureaucracy of the Inquisition finally
located the only surviving witness in the Queretaro area. On
September 18, 18°9, the Reverend Father Fray Francisco LOpez,
who was serving as First Preacher of the Convent of San Antonio
de Queretaro, testified about events of a decade before. Until he
was specifically prompted by Commissary Dr. Rafael Gil de Leon,
Fr. Lopez could not recall the Sant-Maxent incidents. Within the
context of gossip about the scandalous trial and suicide of Juan
Marie Murgier, Lopez did remember how Sant-Maxent had
criticized the Mexican Inquisition for its anti-French prosecutions in the mid-1790'S. He also remembered that Francisco SantMaxent had remarked that everyone was preoccupied with re-
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ligious arguments in the province and that they were losing all
sense of perspective. Then he made his oft-quoted statement that
the arguments would be resolved on Judgment Day when mankind would know for sure which religion and which political
system, French or Spanish, was the true one. As far as SantMaxent's life style and conduct were concerned, Father Lopez
said he had never heard him attack religion or the Church per se.
Indeed, he had observed that Francisco Maximiliano Sant-Maxent
was always among the first at church to hear Mass, and that he
treated the clergy with esteem and respect.
Fray Simon Francisco Coronel, the chaplain of Sant-Maxent's
regiment when he was stationed in New Santander, wrote from
the Villa Nueva de Croix to say that he remembered the captain
as a man who led a normal existence and whose religious sentiments gave no indication of scandal or wrongdoing. With these
reports the second investigation of Francisco Maximiliano's orthodoxy ended in October of 18°9. While the dossier contains no
clues to the Holy Office's motivations in 18°9, it seems safe to
assume that the second investigation was somehow related to
a security check prior to Sant-Maxent's appointment as Governor
of Pensacola in 1811. It is interesting to note that the fiscal of
the Holy Office, when he suspended the proceedings, lamented
that the evidence against Sant-Maxent was "very weak."
In line with· the attempt to avoid open Inquisitorial activity
within Louisiana proper, the Mexican Holy Office often compiled
dossiers on suspected heretics within the military establishment
and then waited for them to go on leave or be transferred to another locale before taking any action. This was the case with
Antonio Ventura Carrion, a thirty-seven-year-old grenadier from
Ciudad Rodrigo in Spain in the Louisiana regiment. Carrion's
comrades denounced him while they were on leave in Puebla.
Carrion was investigated for heresy and obscene language in
April 1797. 52 Before the trial ended almost two years later, perhaps a dozen of Ventura Carrion's comrades in arms had offered
proof of his blasphemies and heresies. The testimonies are so
thoroughly scatological that the worst of them cannot be ana-
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lyzed here. That Antonio was a foul-mouthed and loud braggart
about his own sexual exploits and a jeering critic of the righteous
cannot be doubted, but in the end the reader comes to distrust the motives of the "comrades" who denounced him.
Of those elements of the trial record which can be recounted
with any delicacy the following are representative of Antonio
Ventura Carrion's character. He had a mocking irreverence for
saints, images, and the priesthood, which he considered an unnatural state. Many times he "talked to" religious sculptures in
a very obscene way. He placed little pieces of bread in front of a
carving of Christ and said: "Take it and eat. Don't you want to
eat?" He told the Christ, "I am as good as you or better, and I eat,"
and "how whipped and bleeding you are-but better you than
me!" Antonio ridiculed religious processions and funerals and
jeered at the passersby and spoke to the corpses. On one memorable occasion during Holy Week he shouted at an image of
Christ being carried through the streets "Why don't you get down
and walk like everyone else?" and "What fine raiments you
wear. Didn't they used to be my own shirt and pants?" More
offensive to his upright colleagues, and to the Holy Office of the
Inquisition, were Ventura Carrion's Freudian allusions to Christ,
the Virgin Mary, and the saints. He used religious literature, devotions, and broadsides torn from the walls of public buildings, as
toilet paper. At great length and many times he disputed the
virginity of the Virgin calling her a common Hebrew woman,
and he made derisive comments about the sex life of Christ and
the apostles. He referred to parts of his anatomy as "Saint this"
and "Saint that." When his critics threatened to denounce him
to the Holy Office for his deeds, Ventura Carrion had said "[expletive] the Inquisition." And so the testimony went. Let the
reader understand that what is recounted here is only the milder
part of the trial record. Real questions arise from the biographical
part of Ventura Carrion's proceso. The astonishing and probably
accurate picture of a young man, more picaresque than evil,
brutalized by the society in which he lived, a thief, liar, and
blasphemer who spent over half of his thirty-seven years in

GREENLEAF: INQUISITION IN SPANISH LOUISIANA

65

jail and a large part of the rest as a draftee or "forced volunteer"
in the military, does much to mitigate his behavior.
Antonio Ventura Carrion was born in Ciudad Rodrigo in Old
Castile around 1760. He knew little of his parents because his
father died when he was seven years old and he was sent to live
in a miller's house and to work for his keep until he reached the
age of fourteen. Antonio told the Inquisitors that he was a baptized Catholic but that he was not sure whether he had ever
been confirmed. However, he had gone to confession and communion and he had heard Mass at regular intervals. When he
was fourteen Ventura Carrion ran away and "fell in with bad
company." He was arrested one night in Ronda and the judge
declared him a vagrant and sentenced him to five years in prison
at the Presidio of EI Ferrol. In 1779 Spain was at war with England and there was a shortage of sailors. Somehow Ventura Carrion was pressed into the navy, but on the way to Cadiz he deserted and roamed around Extremadura until he got a job in
Portugal with a band of roving bullfighters. Soon, however, he
got drafted into the army and spent a tour of duty in Mallorca.
After he extricated himself from this situation, he spent a year
and a half in Zamora as servant to a colonel. One night one of
the colonel's soldiers robbed his master's house and Antonio was
blamed. This time he was condemned to a ten-year stretch in
the Presidio at Oran in North Africa. While he was there he got
overly familiar with a lady and said insulting things to her. As
a result he was flogged, and he tried to kill one of the guards
after wresting a musket from him. Thereafter they transferred
him to the prison in Almanza Castle and lengthened his sentence. It was then that he was allowed to volunteer for military
service in Louisiana.
Antonio pictured his life as a grenadier in Louisiana as hard
but permissive in discipline. He became dissolute, irreligious, and
obscene. Ventura CarrIon and his friend, a Corporal Francisco
Romafia, who was also tried for blasphemy in 1797, had the same
attitudes: "In this life one must eat, drink and enjoy oneself because after death there is nothing." Antonio claimed that this was
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the philosophy of life of everyone in Louisiana. When the hvo
soldiers, accompanied by other disapproving comrades, went on
leave to Puebla in April 1797, one of the soldiers, who was from
Puebla, Juan Francisco Bujanos, denounced them to the Inquisition. Other Louisiana soldiers gave evidence and some testimony
was solicited by mail from New Orleans. After it had been evaluated by the Inquisition attorneys, Ventura Carrion was formally
arraigned. The prosecutor charged that he was "a man alienated
from God, obscene, scandalous, blasphemous, and a heretic. His
utterances were offensive, impious, libertine, iconoclast, and
Calvinist." On September I I , 1797, he was removed from the
Puebla jail and conducted to the Inquisition jail in Mexico City.
There he languished for months while the wheels of justice
turned. By January 1798 the staff of the Holy Office had spent
considerable time counseling Antonio and showing him the error
of his ways. He made a statement to the Tribunal on January I I
which was full of contrition and penitence. Antonio admitted to
being a weak and miserable sinner but he contended that he had
never renounced the Catholic religion. He had always maintained
an inner reverence for sacred images although he publicly mocked
them. He realized that he had committed crimes against the
Faith but he swore they were without malice and without knowledge of their gravity.
Whether from fear of punishment or true regeneration, Antonio Ventura Carrion humbled himself before the Inquisitors
and begged for mercy. He now swore that he unreservedly believed in the omnipotence of God, the perpetual virginity of the
Virgin, and all of the other dogmas of the Church. He was renewing his knowledge of the catechism, the credo, and the sacraments, and he pled only to be allowed to live and die as a good
Christian. He recognized his faults and dubbed himself as a
"poor Gachupin" who would never again deviate from his faith
"even if he were tortured" by those who hoped to lead him astray.
Evidently the Holy Office of the Inquisition did not consider
Ventura Carrion incorrigible, and most probably the judges were
swayed to leniency by his contrition and by the dreadful circum-
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stances of his formative years. On July 7, 1798, the proceso ended
with the hint that Antonio Ventura Carrion was to be re-educated
and reconciled with the Church. The final trial records are fragmentary and do not contain data after 1798. But the judges decided to send an extract of the proceedings to the Supreme Council of the Inquisition in Spain in order that the Inquisitor General and Spanish officialdom might study the kind of problems
faced in enforcing orthodoxy in Spanish Louisiana.
A case similar to Carrion's was the 1799 probe into the life
and morals of Juan Braschi, captain of the Brigantine St. Gertrudis out of New Orleans. 54 Since he often traveled to Mexico
it seemed advisable to arrest him there to avoid scandal. If Carrion
was a blasphemous and obscene soldier, Braschi was his nautical
counterpart. His remarks about the Pope and the morality of the
clergy rankled the religious establishment. He read prohibited
books and bragged about it, and his relations with a multitude of
women were a New Orleans scandal. He openly espoused French
political philosophy. Because the trial record is &agmentary we
do not know the results ofthe investigation.
The diocesan records show a like concern for enforcing moral
conduct among the Louisiana colonists. In June of 1797 Father
Pierre Joseph Didier reported to the bishop's office on measures
to curb blasphemy in the Missouri country, and in February 1797
records of the ecclesiastical judge in New Orleans contain proceedings against another soldier, Miguel Solivella, for sexual
immorality. 55 This same "Soldevilla" was investigated by the Inquisition Commissary in Queretaro, Mexico, in 1799 when residents denounced him as a heretic and blasphemer while he was
touring the bajfo area recruiting soldiers for the Louisiana regiment. 56 While he was trying to convince a young boy from her
father's household to join the army; Soldevilla visited with Maria
Petra Suesnabar and her friends in Queretaro on three separate
occasions. He said such shocking things that she decided to inform against him to the Commissary of the Holy Office on June
8, 1799. Maria Petra never found out his first name and knew
the accused only as "Soldevilla." He had told her that the be-
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lief in immortality of the soul was false because after death
the body was returned to dirt and the soul was converted into
smoke. Consequently, he argued, there was no such thing as
heaven or hell or saints. To prove his point he suggested to Maria
Petra that she beseech a statue of San Antonio in her house to
perform a miracle. Soldevilla proceeded to tell her and her girl
friends not to believe what the clergy preached because all religious beliefs were nothing but folk customs. On his third visit to
their home Soldevilla told Maria Petra he believed only in God
and the Holy Virgin but he did not believe in plural representations of the Virgin, for she was only one person and not many as
some people believed. The girls were scandalized by Soldevilla's
statements, and the other women, in separate appearances before
the Comisario, substantiated what Maria Petra had said. Meanwhile Soldevilla and his troops had left Queretaro and the Commissary forwarded his investigation to the Mexican capital. The
staff of the Holy Office searched its files for any additional information that might pertain to Soldevilla to no avail, but they
had no recourse to the Louisiana diocesan papers, where "Solevilla" did indeed have a record.
By I 799, the last year of Spanish rule before the territory was
ceded back to France, the Mexican Tribunal of the Holy Office
had amassed a body of data on heresy in Louisiana. Perhaps the
judges had begun to feel that the province was so permeated with
moral laxity and foreign ideas that it was virtually impossible to
contain the spread of heresy and to discipline proscribed conduct.
Inquisition records showed that even the Catholic citizenry were
liberal, iconoclastic, and often anticlerical. This was the environment promoted by the Spanish state to further its political
and economic goals in Louisiana.
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FRIARS, BUREAUCRATS,
AND THE SERIS OF SONORA

JOHN L. KESSELL

THE

friar's hemorrhoids were killing him. "Full of years and
the most painful afRictions," Father President Mariano Buena
had no choice but to give up. Four years earlier, in I 768, the
strong-willed veteran had led fourteen of his brethren from the
Franciscan missionary college at Queretaro, in central Mexico,
north a thousand miles by land and sea to the frontier province
of Sonora. They had taken over secondhand missions left vacant by the Jesuit Expulsion. They had endured arrogance and
apathy from their neophytes and from government bureaucrats;
they had lived with drought and flood, epidemics, heat, and squalor; they had seen Apache arrows stuck in the doors of their
churches. As superior in the field Fray Mariano had seen it all.
Soon, God willing, he would walk again in the gardens of the
College.
A younger man, tall and austere, his gray habit hanging loosely
on his slender frame, stood nearby. Forty-four-year-old Juan
Crisostomo Gil de Bernabe, chosen by the College to succeed
Father Buena, had ridden down to Ures in the valley of the RIO
Sonora with a prayer on his lips and an emptiness in the pit of his
stomach. For almost four years he had persevered at Los Santos
Angeles de Guevavi, a run-down adobe compound in the mesquite ten miles northeast of today's Nogales, Arizona. He had
done his best through an interpreter to instruct his Pimas and
papagos. He had felt an abiding compassion for them, but he had
hardly reached them.
OLD
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Fray Juan, a fervently penitential Christian, had come to the
Indies from a severe mountain-top monastery in Aragon, where a
crucifix bled and spoke with a friar. He wore a hair shirt, scourged
his flesh, and wept while saying Mass. Gil's impact had been
greater on the culturally Hispanic mixed-breeds of the nearby
Tubac garrison. Few Indians could comprehend such seemingly
pointless suffering.
Now at Ures in the spring of 1772 Juan Gil listened intently
as Buena, propped up in his cell, recounted the most critical issue
facing him as the new Father President-what to do about the
Seri Indians.!

NEVER more than a few thousand individuals in all, the Seris
of Sonora had stubbornly resisted domestication. Roaming the
bone-dry, two-hundred-mile-Iong gulf coast north from Guaymas,
loosely organized bands of these primitive fishermen and gatherers had clashed with Spaniards for a century. Though the Jesuits had lured some of them into inland missions, Seri-Spanish relations had consisted in the main of raids, retaliation, treachery,
deportation, escape, and mutual loathing. "This nation, of all
the Indian nations known up to now," wrote a Spanish officer,
"has been and is without doubt the most inconstant, bellicose,
stubborn, ungrateful, and cruel. . . . They are the ones who with
unthinkable savagery poison their arrows, setting a bad example
to the other tribes, and thereby assure that the slightest wound
is fatal."2
By the mid-1760'S the Seris, joined by rebel Pimas in the incredibly stark and hostile Cerro Prieto region due north of Guaymas, cast a menacing shadow across the province. For Spanish
cattlemen, miners, and missionaries it meant a two-front warwith the Seris on the west and the relentless Apaches to the
north. In 1768 the greatest military expedition in Sonora's history
had gathered at Pitic, present-day Hermosillo, to attack and pursue the Seris, in the words of the obese Governor Juan de Pineda,
"until their total extinction."
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In two massive assaults Pineda and Colonel Domingo Elizondo
commanding over a thousand armed men-veterans from Mexico,
frontier presidials, and native auxiliaries-had failed to dislodge
an estimated two hundred families. After that, they resorted to
guerrilla tactics. 3
In the meantime,' the king's brilliant, egocentric minister extraordinary to New Spain, Jose de Gilvez, hoping to further fragment the hostiles and to reap personally the glory of victory, had
offered an alternative to extermination. Writing from Baja California in March 1769, he requested Father President Buena to
let the Seris and their allies know-without disclosing Galvez'
part in it-that pardon was theirs if they would surrender upon
the Visitor General's arrival. When that failed, and nearly cost
the life of a friar, Galvez beneficently proclaimed a general amnesty. Yet by summer only a few dozen hungry Seris had straggled
into the concentration camp at Pitic. Some devilish Pimas, it
seemed, had spread the lie that the Spaniards meant to murder
the Seri headmen and throw the rest into the sea. 4
Determined to break the impasse, iron-fisted Galvez himself
had reined up in Pitic October I, 1769. Father Buena was with
him, ready even then to found a mission for the Indians the
Visitor had vowed to humble. But Galvez had been driving himself too hard. At Pitic he suffered a complete mental breakdown.
Instead of riding off the conqueror, the "new Balboa," as the
gacetas had begun to call him, profoundly depressed, he let himself be carried to Ures where for five months Buena served the
most powerful official in New Spain as priest, protector, and analyst. The Father President had not been shy about asking for
favors. All he had received in return was a courteous letter and
some oil for the altar lamp.5 That, Buena told his successor, was
the problem: government officials kept demanding a Seri mission,
but when the friars asked for help the bureaucrats sat on their
.
hands.
The dismal contest had dragged on for two more years. Spanish
search-and-destroy units disappeared into the arid fastness of Seriland, and small groups of beaten, sick, and starving natives
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emerged to give themselves up. Measles and smallpox stalked the
hostiles' camps. Turncoat Seris like Crisanto, who had become
the Spaniards' chief ally, emissary, and scout, made the rounds
telling their desperate relatives of the rations and respite to be
had at Pitic. By April 1770 one hundred and fifty-one pitiful
refugees had turned themselves in, and more were on the way.6
A year later Crisanto and three of his fellows, wearing their
pelican-skin robes and shell necklaces, had traveled under escort
to Mexico City where they appeared at the viceregal palace to
swear undying Seri allegiance before the Marques de Croix and
a smug Jose de Galvez. These Indians assured Spanish officials that
they themselves would deal with the holdout called Marcos and
with the Seris still at large on Tiburon Island. 7 By the summer
of 1771 Colonel Elizondo and his veterans had been recalled,
not because they had gained total victory in Sonora but because
the viceroy feared war with Great Britain. Marcos gave up that
winter, and the Tiburones sent word of their desire for peace. 8
While naked Seri POWs stood in line at Pitic for rations their
captors debated what to do with them. Some Spaniards could never
forget past atrocities. They urged that the savages be split up and
exiled. At first the king listened to them. Colonel Elizondo
objected. Indicting previous governors of Sonora for their bungling and treachery, he told how he and Pineda had struggled to
win the Seris' confidence. Were they now to walk up to Crisanto
and the others and announce their exile? Never again would an
Indian trust a Spaniard. Besides, the Seris would rather die than
leave the land of their fathers. Rather than exile, Elizondo proposed subsidies. Give them arable land, seed, plows, and oxen.
Once the Seris learned how satisfying agriculture could be, the
government could cut off the dole. To instruct them in the Faith
the colonel asked for a missionary, an extremely able and patient one, since these Indians were, in his words, "more atheistic
than heathen." In due course the king concurred. 9
Just before he decamped late in April 1771, Elizondo had sat
two long nights parleying with Seri headmen at Pitic. They had
agreed on a site for their settlement "a short musketshot" from the
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garrison. It was, the commander believed, "the most suitable we
could have hoped for. . . . From the willingness to work I observe
and from their diligence in acquiring a few reales to clothe their
families, I am convinced that they will continue in good faith."
On their way back from Mexico City the Seri delegation had
stopped at Alamos, two hundred miles southeast of Pitic, to call
on Intendant Pedro Corbalan, a Galvez appointee who became
interim governor after Pineda suffered a stroke. Corbalan had
urged exile, but he quickly changed his stance when the idea lost
favor. The Indians presented don Pedro with an order from the
Marques de Croix : "You will see to it that the Seris are established in a formal town and doctrina on the site agreed upon with
Colonel Domingo Elizondo at the Indians' own request, naming
it Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe." The intendant-governor was
also to arrange with Father President Buena for a missionary
to the Seris. 1Q
The proposed Pitic settlement was no ordinary doctrina. The
government had spent hundreds of thousands of pesos to congregate a few hundred Seris. When the defense of New Spain dictated, the viceroy had pulled back Elizondo and his regulars.
Because of the high initial investment and commitments elsewhere, word came down: whatever it takes, keep the Seris quiet.
And no matter how logically the Franciscans argued against
coddling these Indians, Pitic remained the peace symbol, a far
cheaper way than war to deal with the Seris.
Everything depended on bringing water to the settlement.
Without irrigation the Seris would never become self-sufficient,
the government would have to keep feeding them; without food
they would Bee back to their coastal haunts and the whole costly
business would begin again. Hence Intendant Corbalan gave
the matter highest priority. He went to Pitic himself in the spring
of I77!. There he commissioned Lieutenant Francisco Mesia
to repair an acequia nearly two miles long, from the Rio Sonora
to the hornos de munici6n, near which he ordered fields cleared.
That fall, as the project neared completion, CorbaIan had written
to Father President Buena in a tone the friar thought imperious.
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Buena should dispatch a missionary to Pitic at once. He could
live temporarily in the house built for Galvez and at least get
started. Since the Seris had been denied the benefit of religion
for so many years, the Padre must proceed prudently and refrain
from punishing them for fear of provoking a new outbreak. He
must incline his charges toward agriculture and encourage them
to work on the all-important ditch. If "by some unlikely chance"
the ditch were not completed, there would be little hope of holding
the Seris at Pitic.l l
No sooner had Corbalan fired off his letter to Buena when
distressing news arrived from Lieutenant Mesla. The flooding
Rio Sonora had cut its channel more than a vara deeper: the entire
acequia would have to be dug out to that depth, which, according
to MesIa, was economically infeasible. There was simply too
much rock. He had therefore let his Pima and Opata Indian
work gangs return to their missions while he sat down to await
further orders.
CorbaIan exploded. Why had the problem not been anticipated
months before and a different site chosen for the ditch or for the
settlement? Mesia would have to work out the least expensive
alternative with the Seris and the friar who, in Corbalan's words,
"I am convinced will soon arrive there."12 On that score too, the
intendant-governor was soon disabused.
Father Buena had responded with his usual candor. At Ures
a missionary for Pitic was standing by, awaiting only the word
"to enter upon this arduous, extremely difficult undertaking."
Buena would have sent him at once had not Corbalan himself stressed the uselessness of the site if the irrigation project
failed. Now that it had failed, the Father President took the opportunity to lecture the intendant on the perils to and the requisites for a missionary to the Seris.
If these Indians, reduced at such great cost, should break away
and return to the Cerro Prieto, whatever the reason, the missionary would reap the blame. If he so much as mentioned work to
them he would incur their "total aversion, or, considering their
savage and indomitable nature, their irreconcilable hatred." When
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to set them an example he went out into the fields with a hoe
they would laugh at him or turn their backs and take off "to roam
the wilds, which is the only thing they are inclined to do from
their scabrous cradle on." If the friar challenged their voracious
consumption of everything including oxen, they would despise
him all the more; if not, there would soon be nothing left. Therefore let someone else make them work and teach them respect
for property.
Even more serious, Father Buena asserted, was the Seris' casual
sex life. No padre could close his eyes to polygamy. Here the
Father President urged CorbaIan to use the authority of his office
to remove "this great and utter obstacle to their conversion"
before the missionary arrived. Furthermore, there must be a
church, if only. of straw, and all the religious paraphernalia, including at least a painting of the Virgin of Guadalupe. 13
Two months later CorbaIan forwarded a copy of Buena's letter to a new viceroy, the able Antonio Maria Bucareli, so that he
could see for himself "the obstacles the said Father President puts
in the way of sending a religious to administer the Seris." Clearly
Father Buena was as negative about the Seris as Colonel Elizondo
was positive. Bucareli demanded further reports. He ordered
Corbalan to do everything in his power to get water to the Seris. 14
And he instructed and sent north to Sonora a new governor, the
frail, not-so-able Mateo Sastre. With Sastre, loose-living former
sergeant major of the Infantry Regiment of Navarre, the ardent
Fray Juan Gil would have to take up the Seri issue. Buena wished
him luck.

As IF there were not enough already to confound the new Father
President, Fray Juan would have to reckon with a bitter, high-level
rivalry. Pedro Corbalan, relative of the Marques de Croix, intendant, and guardian of the royal treasury at Alamos, represented the Galvez-Croix tradition. He worked to consummate
their bold designs. Mateo Sastre, delegated by a more conservative but no less forceful viceroy, wanted more than anything
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else to make a name for himself. An ill-defined division of powers
between the experimental intendancy and the governorship heightened the tension. Both men sought the distinction of pacifying
the Seris once and for all. 15
While Governor Sastre made his way slowly up from the
south, Intendant Corbalan tried desperately to finish the ditch.
He entered into a contract with Teniente PolItico Juan Honorato
de Rivera who guaranteed to see the job through for thirteen
hundred pesos. By midsummer it appeared that he might. 16
Sweaty and uncomfortable, Governor Sastre finally reached
Pitic in the muggy heat of July 1772. He inspected the ditch
and reported to the Minister of the Indies in Spain, "I am encouraging the work from time to time in person on horseback.
I shall serve as overseer until its conclusion, which I feel certain
will occur on August 8." The Seris themselves seemed content.
"The only cause for regret is that they are living without religion-they do not confess, receive the sacraments, or hear the
word of God-in sum, they are living like idolaters." When the
governor admonished Crisanto, the Indian professed that all his
people wanted to be Christians, but that they had neither priest
nor church. As a token of their good intentions the males had
already given up all but their woman of longest standing. 17
When labor troubles and torrential rains halted work on the
acequia, Sastre rode on north along the muddy Rio San Miguel
to his capital, the unpretentious presidential town of Horcasitas.
Here he straight-away suffered an attack which temporarily paralyzed his right side. Here Father President Juan Gil came to pay
his respects.
Why, the governor demanded, had the friars not placed a
missionary at Pitic? Did they not wish to minister to the Seris?
They did, vowed Gil, but until the ditch was done, until Mexico
City allocated funds for a church, their hands were tied. 1s While
at Horcasitas, Gil learned "by chance" that Sastre was withholding news of an auspicious event, apparently because he intended
to take all the credit himself.
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Two Tiburon Indians, Cazoni and Tumuzaqui, had come in
to welcome the new governor and swear obedience. "Having
thanked them warmly for their courtesy," Sastre bragged, "I
tried to counsel and persuade them to accept reason and embrace our Holy Faith. It would seem that they valued my advice and the personal way in which I spoke to them, for as a
result of this they presented me with the attached memorial." The
paper they had marked with crude crosses said that they earnestly
desired salvation, ministers, and a church-on Tiburon Island.
Before these heathens could change their minds the anxious
Sastre, fancying himself subduer of the Tiburones, sent Lieutenant Manuel de la Azuela and eight soldiers to reconnoiter the
island and designate the most approprite site for a mission. Juan
Gil went along "on his own."19
Jagged Tiburon, a three-hundred-thousand-acre piece of Scr
noran Desert broken off from the mainland, had long been home
to the Tiburones, one of a half dozen Seri subgroups recognized
by the Spaniards. To their would-be conquerors it became a
symbol of the Seris' barbarous freedom, a last stronghold, the
final obstacle to pacification. Galvez had wanted to invade it,
occupy the few waterholes, take off the people, and thereby Hrid
this interior gulf of a real barrier to free navigation."20 Later when
a Tiburon delegation had begged the Spaniards' pardon and
promised not to harass mainland residents they had been given
leave to stay, but Hwarned that at the least violation troops would
come and put them to the sword."21
At Carrizal, a meager waterhole on the sandy coastal plain
opposite the island, Lieutenant Azuela and Father Gil met with
Cazoni and some twenty families. Once Azuela, in the name of
Governor Sastre, had created the Tiburon chief captain general
of his nation and instructed him to raise a hundred warriors in
the king's service, Gil asked, through the Indian interpreter
Francisco, whether they were willing to give up their heathen
ways. They answered yes, but there were conditions.
First, the mission must be founded at Carrizal, where all the
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island dwellers, estimated at more than five hundred, would congregate. And second, Fray Juan himself must be their missionary
"until death." The Franciscan, displaying more zeal than good
sense, agreed. He and Azuela then crossed over to the island to
parley with the others, who approached them unarmed carrying
makeshift crosses. The conditions were the same.
The very night he returned to Horcasitas, Juan Gil wrote
the governor. To show Sastre just how much the Franciscans
did want to minister to the Seris, the Father President outlined
a bold new economic base for a mission at barren Carrizal.
Since the place was, in the friar's words, "utterly useless for
any kind of planting" and the land "pure sand and alkali," he
proposed a salt works and fishing as mission industries. For the
first he would need twenty or twenty-five of the army surplus
mules left behind by Elizondo, and for the second, one of the
government-owned launches at Guaymas. To reduce further the
cost of maintaining himself, a missionary companion, and the
neophytes at Carrizal, Gil suggested the appropriation of two
additional sites, thirty and forty-five miles away, for a dry farm
and a stock ranch, the first at a place called Tenuaje and the
second "between Siete Cerritos and the Cerro del Guzguz." He
also asked for some of the excess oxen at Pitic and for seed. The
next day, September 17, Sastre forwarded Gil's letter to the
viceroy, admitting that the friar's recommendations were not
without merit. 22
Intendant CorbaIan in the meantime had begun to get on
Sastre's nerves. He continued to direct the Pitic project from
Alamos as if he were still governor. He wrote asking Sastre to
persuade the Seris to clear fields for winter wheat. He announced
that he had commissioned his subdelegate Pedro T ueros to divide
up Seri holdings, once the acequia was operable, into family plots,
commons, and church land for Mission Nuestra Senora de
Guadalupe "which is what the pueblo is to be called." He told
Juan Antonio Meave, agent in charge of the government dole, to
make plows and oxen available. And, remembering the deceased
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Father Buena's refusal, he again urged Viceroy Bucareli to see
that a friar be named for the Seris.
At Pitic contractor Rivera struggled to finish the ditch. When
all the Indian tapisques deserted him, he kept the job going with
a half dozen Pimas from the presidio. He applied for more workers to Sastre, who took no action for a month. He fought rain
and boulders. Then on September 18 he made a cautious prediction to CorbaIan-the Seris could begin planting October 1.23
Father President Gil recognized the implications. No longer
was Buena's hard line tenable. In their reports to Bucareli both
Sastre and CorbaUm were putting pressure on the Franciscans.
Gil kept the College informed, and in mid-October, just as water
finally reached the Seris at Pitic, the friars made their bid with
the viceroy. The College was destitute. Funds for church, padres'
quarters, and maintenance would have to come from the government. Support for two missionaries was essential since the College's closest mission was sixty miles from Pitic and "because
these Seris have given ample proof of their inconstancy, no less
of their cruelty, and therefore one must fear, with more than
enough cause, a sudden uprising."24
While the viceroy's fiscal considered the friar's request, Fray
Juan Gil accompanied the inspection party on a tour of the completed irrigation project. All agreed. It was strong, well-built,
and carried an abundance of water. Resolved now to found a mission, the Father President went begging: wine, wax, whatever
people would give. Because he himself was committed to the
Tiburones, he named thin-faced young Matias Gallo missionary to the Seris at Pitic. 25
For a year and a half Intendant Pedro Corbalan had anguished
over the Pitic ditch. Now, while he fussed about the way in which
his underlings had terminated the contract with Rivera, Sastre
stepped in and stole the show.26
Ju~t back from the Cieneguilla placers, the ailing governor
summoned his strength and rode to Pitic, arriving November 16.
He had decided to so do, he later informed CorbaIan sarcastically,
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"so that neither you nor I would be thought negligent." Finding
the Seris lolling about, but allegedly wanting to work, Sastre ordered ten fully rigged plows and as many yokes of oxen turned
over to them on the spot.
At once I [Sastre] moved on to the inspection of the lands accompanied by the Reverend Father Fray Juan Crisostomo, President
of these missions. At the same time I also designated their community lands, marking out for the Indians a half league in each of the
four directions with the center point at the Cerro de la Conveniencia,
situated that same distance from the pueblo. I commissioned the
aforesaid Father to make the distribution to each individual family
in the presence of Governor Crisanto, War Captain Jose Antonio,
and some of the other caciques, which pleased them very much. The
following day I had the pleasure of seeing the soil broken by their
plows and a half fanega of wheat planted. 27

Government agent Meave was conspicuously absent that day.
He had provided no place in the pueblo for the friars to stay. Still,
on November 17, 1772, in the name of the College of Queretaro
and in the utmost poverty, Fathers Gil and Gallo founded the
Seri mission, calling it San Antonio de Padua. Nuestra Senora de
Guadalupe-the choice of Galvez, Croix, and Corbalan-became
an alternate patroness. The same day, November 17, Viceroy
Bucareli authorized the construction of a church at Pitic at royal
expense. He also politely rebuffed the friars. So long as the Seris
maintained good faith, one missionary would be sufficient, one
who could manage newly pacified Indians, treat them gently, and
incline them toward agriculture. 28
Before the governor left Pitic a group of Tiburones showed
up. They still wanted to settle at Carrizal. Sastresummoned
Father Gil. Then and there he arranged with the friar to take
them seed and rations, to remove them from the island, and to
set a date when plows and oxen should be delivered, or so Sastre
told the viceroy. According to Franciscan sources, the governor
compelled Fray Juan to go ill-provisioned into the wilderness.
Whatever the case, it cost the Father President his life. 29
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NOT ALL the Tiburones wanted a mISSIOn. Some had spoken
against Cazoni, against appeasing Spaniards in any way. Yet a
crowd came over from the island for the founding at Carrizal
November 26. They accepted gifts and pozole and stood around
as Fray Juan went through the curious ritual of the Mass. Some
helped put up the large ramada that served as a church. They
built a hut of poles and brush for the Father and others for Captain General Cazoni, Governor Hernando Nanos, and War Captain Pavacot. But few came to catechism. Mission Duldsimo
Nombre de Jesus was little more than a token. so
Gil, left with only his young acolyte, kept hoping that approval
of his plan would arrive from Mexico City. While he waited he
taught some of the children to cross themselves and tried to get
the men to catch more fish than they ate. Until he could offer
them tangible benefits, the Tiburones would continue to roam
and hunt turtles, ignorant that Jesus Christ had died for them.
While Father Gil endured at Carrizal, bureaucrats Corbalan
and Sastre kept up their feud. The intendant bitterly resented
the governor's thinly veiled charge of negligence. In the matter
of the Seris he would stand on his record. Agent Meave and
Subdelegate Tueros dutifully minimized Sastre's role: the governor had only stayed at Pitic a day; he had accomplished nothing
new; and the Seris were not all of a sudden happily plowing fields.
When Apaches struck at his capital, Sastre withdrew all but a
handful of the Pitic garrison to Horcasitas. Fray Matias Gallo
left. Until there were a church and quarters for him he preferred
to live at Ures and commute. Corbalan proposed to the viceroy
that Seri crops be meted out by the friar or an agent. If, as Sastre
had suggested, they were divided immediately on a family basis
the Indians would wolf them down or sell them. Though Bucareli
continued to enjoin cooperation between intendant and governor,
he feared that their discord might wreck the Seri peace. 31
From time to time Fray Juan Gil emerged from the wilderness
to satisfy the demands of his office. Whenever the Father President was in Horcasitas the people knew it. They jammed the
church to hear a one-man revival. As far as don Miguel Joseph de
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Arenibar, the absentee parish priest, was concerned, the Franciscan zealot could inveigh against sin till the whole bawdy populace repented. Once, the licentious Sastre invited Father Gil to
stay in the governor's quarters. Whatever his host did, it so scandalized the friar that he left in a huff. Opponents of the governor
saw to it that word of the incident reached the viceroy.32
Sastre was sick. Late in December Bucareli admonished him
for not reporting on a number of urgent matters. "The signatures
on my letters," Sastre pleaded on February I, 1773, "will prove
to Your Excellency the deplorable state of my suffering." Father
Gil wrote from Carrizal. He still had not received all the promised
supplies, or approval of his proposals. It appeared that the bureaucrats looked upon Carrizal as no more than a half-way station.
They seemed to expect the Tiburones to come in from there to
Pitic. No matter. Wretched and forsaken, Gil was content. All he
wanted was to end his life in the company of his Tiburones. On
March 7, with little warning, he got his wish. 33
The night before, a Tiburon lad named Ixquisis, evidently put
up to it by the anti-Spanish faction, started a rumor at Carrizal.
Rebel Pimas, he said, were on their way to murder the missionary
and the Indians who had invited him. Not waiting for verification, Gil and his neophytes cleared out. About midnight from a
hill nearby they looked down to see Barnes leaping from the huts.
On the morning of the seventh Father Gil sent Cazoni to round
up the people while he and the acolyte started back down. Part
way Ixquisis and three youths blocked their path. Fray Juan greeted
them. He took tobacco from the sleeve of his habit and started
to hand it to them. When one stooped to pick up a big rock Gil
yelled at his assistant to run.
It hit the friar square in the chest smashing the crucifix he
carried. As he cried out condemning his tormentors another rock
caught him on the forehead. He went down. Even after they had
beaten him lifeless, the acolyte recalled, they kept on pounding
the corpse. Then they ran.
When Cazoni and the others found the body they carried it
back to the smouldering mission. As they were setting up an
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anny tent to cover the grave, someone recognized two of the
assailants. Cazoni executed them on the spot. With their severed
heads and some of the sacred objects from the church he set out
for Pitic.
Word had already reached Horcasitas. Lieutenant Azuela rode
at once. At Pitic he met Cazoni. Thanking the native leader for
his loyalty, he asked him to return to Carrizal ahead of the soldiers to calm his people. Only the guilty parties had cause to fear.
As the column drew near, all the Tiburones who had not fled
to the island, children and adults, came out to meet it, weeping
for Fray Juan, noted the lieutenant. The soldiers marveled at the
tent, "a sign of the Indians' veneration, a deed most admirable
among these heathens." Much to their relief, Cazoni had already
captured Ixquisis. Azuela heard the testimony of both Indians and
took custody of the prisoner. Then, exhorting the Tiburones not
to let this heinous crime lead to general rebellion, he rode in haste
for Horcasitas. Governor Sastre was dead. 34

SIX WEEKS after the murder of Juan Gil, Bucareli sent his condolences to the College and requested that the friars name another
Father President. No friend of Galvez' intendant system, the
viceroy had already passed over Pedro CorbaIan and designated
veteran Captain Bernardo de Urrea interim governor and judge
in the case against Ixquisis. Even though "this inhuman and
horrible crime . . . cries out for the most severe and exemplary
punishment," he insisted on due process of the law. Because So:Qora lacked lawyers, he forwarded detailed instructions. Nothing
must be done to alienate the rest of the Tiburones. Cazoni should
be rewarded. The viceroy ordered the remains of Father Juan Gil
exhumed and transferred to the closest church.35
The Tiburones were torn. "Under no circumstances are these
Indians to be forced," read the instructions to Sastre's successor,
"nor are those who might move [away from Carrizal] to be restrained."36 Just when it appeared that Fray Juan had died in
vain, Cazoni presented himself before Captain Urrea saying that
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his people wanted a settlement and lands like those of their relatives at Pitic. That could be arranged, the interim governor allowed, at a site called Torre6n, a league west of Pitic. 37
Late in September Urrea and Father Arenibar, who had thought
Gil a fool in the first place to trust the barbaric Tiburones, rode
out to Carrizal to redeem the martyr's bones. They found the tent
intact. When the grave was opened they noticed no foul odor.
They placed the bones in a wooden box along with the relics the
Indians had buried with the body-the missionary's rosary, medals,
and cross, the broken crucifix, and the book he was carrying when
slain, the Mistica Ciudad of Venerable Maria de Agreda. Back at
Horcasitas the box was placed temporarily in the church on a
table shrouded in black and surmounted by four candles. The
people came and wept. A week later Fray Matias Gallo and Fray
Francisco Antonio Barbastro carried it to Ures for burial,38
the decade after Gil's death, the Seris reverted. Reports
of their "fine carpet of ripe wheat" and their delight with free
clothes were offset by reports that they were selling their rations
and trafficking with bad Indians. Bureaucrat Corbalan held up
construction of the Pitic church, first because there was no precedent for building a mission church in Sonora at the king's expense, and second for lack of an architect. Captain Urrea remitted
to Mexico City the evidence in the Ixquisis case, but before final
judgment was rendered the defendant died in jail,39 A new governor, don Francisco Antonio Crespo, listened cautiously for a
time to the blandishments of the Tiburones. At their invitation
he even rode out to Carrizal, to find the place deserted. He then
reported to Bucareli:
DURING

The settlement they had at Carrizal during the time of my predecessor ... was no more than show, without the least stability. By
and large they opposed the presence of the friar. Although the
general, Ignacio Cazoni, and a few others acted then, and even to
the present, in good faith, this Indian enjoys neither the authority
nor the respect necessary (as I have already told Your Excellency)
for us to hope with any basis in fact for the desired end. 4Q

Detail from a stylized eighteenth-century portrait of Juan Gil.
Courtesy Museo Municipal, Queretaro

W. J. McGee, "The Seri Indians,"
Bureau of American Ethnology Annual Report no. 17 (1898)
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Cazoni, who did settle near Pitic with forty-seven Tiburones, accused Crisanto of witchcraft and the murder of one of Cazoni's
daughters. Crisanto then murdered Cazoni and escaped. 41
In view of the Seris' "perverse habits" Bucareli approved a
second missionary and a guard detail at Pitic. But the tide had
turned. A few at a time they slipped away. Then the bloody raids
resumed, and Spaniards began counting up the times these Indians had rebelled-fourteen, some said.
By 1780 frontier commanders had once again put the blame
for all Sonora's woes squarely on the vile, unregenerate Seri nation. Pedro Corbalan, again elevated to the position of intendantgovernor when Galvez became minister of the Indies, admitted
that after a decade of experience with the Seris he could only conclude that "very little or nothing at all has altered their perverse
way of thinking or reformed their depraved inclinations toward
idleness, sloth, and licentiousness." Let the savages die in the
field or surrender and be exiled, "the males twelve years and older
to Havana and the women and children to the Californias." He
had used the same words nine years before. 42
Galvez, too, revived an earlier plan. In March 1782 he emerged
from an audience with the king and announced:
His Majesty believes that to chastise the Seris and their relatives of
Tibur6n Island it would be advisable as soon as possible [i.e., when
the war with Great Britain was over] to mount a vigorous and wellplanned expedition against this island in an effort to annihilate all
its perfidious inhabitants capable of bearing arrns. 48

THE SERl fiasco of the early 1770's could hardly have been averted. It had happened before, and it would happen again. Yet in
the effort to pacify Sonora and to civilize and save souls, they all
had to try-the grand Galvez, the enlightened Elizondo, the
bureaucrat Corbalan, realistic, outspoken Father Buena, desperate
Sastre, and the self-mortifying Fray Juan Gil. When extermination
failed, they tried to make the Seris Christian peasant farmers, to
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assimilate them by force. If Corbalan suggested stock raising and
Gil a fishing cooperative they did so only as half-way measures. H
The ideal remained the same.
But the Seris, Sonora's only totally non-agricultural people,
refused to fit the mold. A few hundred survive today. They fish
and carve. They still do not farm.
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